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I

MEMORANDUM 'IO THE cc:NFERENCE
From:

Joe Caldwell

Subject:

Pending Abortion Cases
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

Introduction: PUrsuant to instructions from the Conference that this
Office review the cases appearing on List 3, Sheet 1 for the April 23
Conference, this memorandum is subni.tted. The pages that follow list the
questions presented in each case, as well as certain potential problems that
might arise if plenary review were granted.
Recomnendation: If the Court is ):jj;lined to review the blo 12ri~y
abortion issues ~parental consent ~econd trimester hospitalization, the
oost Sirit ilEle ve cle mi
be simo ulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185. This
criminal case reaches
th issue • however, it does not entail state-imposed
•obstacles to abortion.•

G-,4 _....-t-

summary of cases:

Regarding the remaining cases:

--

No. 81-1623, Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood:
hospitalization issue.

presents only the

No. 81-1255, Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft:
parental consent issue.

strains to present the

o~,r

No. 81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and No. 81-854,

~eguin and Black v. Akron Center Center for Reproductive Health:
~

~

possible
mootness problem as to the parental consent issue, and abseoce of state cour ~
statutory construction.
11 qq\ t\~S s
ft't~llle,...,
;s, t'€~1,

(? \

No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron:

only the hospitalization issue. '-

___.

c..•~~.., ly

(202) 252-3282

frt's f , ~el,

presents

G- r~V\;f

I

No. 81-185, Simopo~ v. Virginia

QUESTIONS PRESENI'ED:

(1)

Whether the State was required to prove that

an abortion performed by appellant was not necessary to save the life of the
mother.
{2)

Whether the prosecution proved that the appellant's administration

of a saline solution caused the death of the fetus.
{3)

1

Whether the State may require hospitalization for all abortion

procedures to be performed after the first trimester of pregnancy.
{4)

Whether a hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional as regards

a minor when all available hospitals require parental consent before admitting
a minor for an abortion.
FACTS:

Appellant is a licensed gynecologist.

P.M., who was 17 years old

and 5 1/2 months pregnant, went to appellant and requested an abortion.

In

his clinic, appellant injected a saline solution into P.M.'s amniotic cavity.
She went to a motel room where two days later she expelled the fetus.
Appellant was indicted and convicted under va. Code §18.2-71 for performing a
second trimester abortion outside of a hospital.
DISCUSSION:
insubstantial.

The first two questions in this criminal appeal appear to be
However, the other two questions make this case the only one

which presents the two major issues of hospitalization and consent; and a good
factual record seems to have been developed by appellant regarding the
acceptability in medical practice of non-hospitalization.

on the other hand, the so-called •obstacles to abortion• here {i.e., the
inconvenience of location, or the requirement of parental consent, Harris v.
McCrae, 448 u.s. 297 {1980)) were not created by the state,

although the

state by statute {Va. §18.2-75) authorizes hospitals to place certain
restrictions on abortions.

The state presented no evidence in this case on

the question of whether the hospitalization requirement bears
relationship to maternal health.

arr;t

significant

- 2-

CDNFERENCE VOI'E:

'IWo Justices voted to NPJ (VUE, JPS); the remaining

seven Justices voted to hold this case for Ashcroft, No. 81-1623.

I

No. 81-1623, Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City

QUESTIONS PRESENrED:

(1)

Whether a state may constitutionally require

that every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy be performed in a hospital.
(2)

Whether a state may constitutionally requl,re that a second physician

attend the performance of an abortion of a •viable fetus.•
(3)

Whether a state may constitutionally require that a tissue sample be

taken of every abortion and be submitted to a qualified pathologist for a
pathology reJ?Ort.
(4)

Whether the DC erred in calculating its award of attorneys fees.

FACTS:

In June 1979 Missouri enacted a comprehensive statute dealing

with abortion.

Resps, two corJ?Orations operating abortion clinics and two

physicians who regularly perform abortions in the clinic and elsewhere, filed
suit in the DC (WD lob.) challenging as unconstitutional certain sections of
the new law.
above.

The three sections at issue are listed in QUestions 1, 2 and 3

At trial, the DC invalidated the requirement that abortions beyond the

first trimester be performed in a hospital and the CA, after remanding for
further factual development, affirmed.

The State Attorney General is seeking

cert to CA 8.
DISCUSSION:

The hospitalization issue appears to be squarely presented

in this case, although the parental consent issue is absent.

Consideration

might be given to a grant limited to QUestion 1.
CONFEREM::E VOI'E:

Five votes to grant ( CJ, BRW, LEP, WHR, SOC) ; one vote

to deny (WJB); three votes to hold [for an unspecified case] (TM, HAB, JPS).

No. 81-1255, PlA

Parenthood Association of Kan.

v. Ashcroft

.·

QUESTIONS PRESENI'ED: . Petrs challenge that portion of the r-D. abortion
statute requiring consent of a parent or juvenile court approval before an
unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion.
FACTS:

(see No. 81-1623)

Petrs are two corporations operating abortion
I

clinics.
DISCUSSION:
strained.

The arguments presented by petrs herein are somewhat

They address their complaint not to the statute as interpreted by

CA 8, but rather to an objectionable interpretation they give to the statute
themselves.

Essentially, they ignore the CA 8 decision which invalidated the

requirement of parental notice even when consent has been provided by a court;
and they argue that the CA 8 interpretation of the statute which makes it
conform to the dictates of this Court is invalid; and that without that
interpretation, the statute violates decisions of this Court.
This case seems unworthy of plenary review, but should probably continue
to be held pending disposition of the lead case, whichever that might be.
CCNFERENCE VOI'E:

Four votes to grant (WJB, BRW, LFP, WHR); one vote to

deny (JPS); four votes to hold [for an unspecified case] (CJ, TM, HAB, SOC).

No. 81-746, Akron .

Akron Center for Reproductive.

alth

No. 81-854, Seguin and Black v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1)

Can the City of Akron require that minors

under 15 obtain consent from their parents or a judge before obtaining an
abortion (or at least require that parents be notified).
(2)

I

Can the City of Akron require that physicians provide certain

information before obtaining consent to perform the abortion.
(3)

Can the City require that the attending physician make certain

disclosures about the risks of the abortion technique to _be employed, or does
this invade the realm of the physician and encumber the decision to have an
abortion.
(4)

Can the City require that there be a 24-hour •cooling-oft- period

between the time a woman consents to an abortion and the time it is performed.
(5)

Can the city require that the remains of the abortive fetuses be

disposed of in a •humane• manner, or is that term void for vagueness.
FACTS:

Petrs are the City and parents of · minor daughters.

DC invalidated the consent requirement.

At trial, the

Although the parents appealed this

issue to CA 6, the City did not. Because the parents now have daughters that
exceed 15 years of age, this issue may not properly be before this Court.
z.t>reover, it is arguable that a state court could give the statute at
issue a construction that is consistent with decisions of this Court, i.e.,
H.L. v. Matheson, 101 s.ct. 1164 (1981) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622
(1979), permitting a •mature• minor under certain circumstaoces to be able to
make her own decision regarding abortions. · However to date the Ohio courts
have not done so.

And this Court has expressed an inclination to defer to

state courts under such circumstances.

Bellotti, S9Pra, at 1436-51.

- 2COOFERENCE VOI'E:

Four votes to grant (BRW, LFP, WHR, SOC); three votes

to deny (WJB, HAB, JPS); two votes to hold [for an unspecified case] (CJ, TM).

I

No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1)

can the City of Akron require that all

abortions after the first trimester be performed in hospitals rather than in
clinics such as those operated by petr.
DISCUSSION:

/

This case is curve-lined with Nos. 81-746 and 81-854 (see

precedif¥3 page) which, when considered with those two cases, presents both the
consent and hospitalization issues, with the potential pitfalls noted.

Should

the Court desire to reach only the hospitalization issue, this case might be
an appropriate vehicle.
CONFEREN:E VOI'E:

Five votes to grant (BRW, HAB, LFP, WHR, JPS); one vote

to deny (WJB); three votes to hold [for an unspecified case] (CJ, TM, SOC).

,·

CONCLUSION: This is a preliminary meJOOrandum which necessarily assumes
certain coocerns of the Confereoce. If, however, the Conference might specify
the issue or issues for which it has the greatest concern, this Office will
respond with a more detailed examination.

'

/bRIL 29, 1982

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Legal Office Memo in Abortion Cases

,,Joe

Caldwell suggests that the Court should rethink its

'' Grant decisions in order to frame the issues most helofully .

I

agree.
poP I ,.,.~_,,J1

I have attached yellow sheets to each of the

in the

order in which CAldwell discusses them, summarizing my reactions.
Overall:

1. I agree that the "best" case is probably NSSimopoulous.

-

I would Grant this case.

2.

~

II

The question of mandatory hospitalization during the second

-------

trimester is presented by three cases, Nos. 81 -1.85 , 81-1263, and

81-1172.

This issue turns out to be surorisingly

wa

It is relevant ._ what other facilities are available in a

3.

~t

particular area ,

I would probably

all three.

important issue.

It should be well framed .

This is an

Unfortunately the question of a "oarental consent" requirement
----.

may well be "moot" in No. 81.-746,

This is unfortunate.

Although

~here is a "consent" issue in No. 81.-1.85' Simo)oulous , / uora,

•+

. . is very oeculiarly framed in that case
not the local ordinances , require the

(Local hosnitals ,

consent ~ )

I would orobably

deny, though the Court conceivably find the issue as
be capab l e of repetition
r

bk~

~~~A.,t,· .,~

'~~·~..v.

-

fact-dependent

•: san • "'fl to

•

~ttp:rttttt Q}ttttrf of f!rt ~Ut?t ~faft.s'

1Uzurltingftm. :!Q. OJ. z.o.;r~~
THE LEGAL OFFICE

May 11, 1982
MEMORANDUM 'IO THE CONFERENCE

I

From:

Joe caldwell~

Subject:

Pending Abortion Cases, May 13, 1982 Conference, List 5, Sheet 1
REVISED MEMORANDUM*

Introduction: Pursuant to instructions from the Conference that this
Office review the cases appearing on List 5, Sheet 1 for the May 13
Conference, this memorandum is submitted. The pages that follow list the
questions presented in each case, as well as certain potential problems that
might arise if plenary review were granted.
Recornmendat~ If the Court is ~ lined to review the two pri~y
A2
abo~tion isaues ~rental consent ~econd trimester hospitaiiZ:a tion, the r~~
rliOst suitable vehicle might Oe §lropoulos v. vLYg'bila, !1o. -nt-IS"S:'"
~

../p

Summary of cases:
No. 81-185, Sirnopoulos v. Virginia: this criminal case reaches both the/)_A. ~ _.J
hospitalization and parental consent issues; however, the •obstacl es to
~~
abortion• are not state-imposed.
No. 81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health: possible
fu_~ _.
mootness problem as to parental consent issue {facts are not entirely clear) ~
and absence of state court statutory construction of the challenged statute.

k

~

No. 81-854, Seguin, et al. v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health:
{this case is curve-lined with No. 81-746, above, since petrs here intervened
below.)

~

No. 81-1172, Akron center for Reproductive Health v. Akron:
only the hospitalization issue.

ve_

presents

No. 81-1255, Planned Parenthood of K.C. v. Ashcroft:
the parental consent issue.

strains to present

No. 81-1623, Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood of K.C.:
hospitalization issue.

presents only the

This memorandum replaces the earlier Legal Office memo, same subject,
dated April 19, 1982. --

~ ~ ~ .£J;t1t~~
Lb

~ ~ ~o.A qf62{2s2-32~ ~

•

NO. 81-185, Simopou1os v. Virginia

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1)

Whether the State was required to prove that an

abortion performed by appellant was not necessary to save the life of the
mother.
(2)

Whether the prosecution proved that the appellant's administration
/

of a saline solution caused the death of the fetus.
(3)

Whether the State may require hospitalization for all abortion

procedures to be performed after the first trimester of pregnancy.
(4)

Whether a hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional as regards

a minor when all available hospitals require parental. consent before admitting
a minor for an abortion.
FAcrS:

Appellant is a licensed gynecologist.

P.M., who was 17 years old

and 5 1/2 months pregnant, went to appellant and requested an abortion.

In

his clinic, appellant injected a saline solution into P.M.'s amniotic cavity.
She went to a motel room where two days later she expelled the fetus.
Appellant was indicted and convicted under va. Code §18.2-71 for performing a
second trimester abortion outside of a hospital.
DISCUSSION:
insubstantial.

The first two questions in this criminal appeal appear to be
However, the other two questions make this case the only one

which presents the two major issues of hospitalization and consent; and a good
factual record seems to have been developed by appellant regarding the
acceptability in medical practice of non-hospitalization.
On the other hand, the so-called •obstacles to abortion• here (i.e., the
inconvenience of location, or the requirement of parental consent, Harris v.
McCrae, 448

u.s.

297 (1980)) were not created by the state; however the state

by statute (Va. §18.2-75) authorizes hospitals to place certain restrictions
on abortions, here,

~'

parental consent.

The State presented no direct

•

- 2 -

evidence in this case on the question of whether the hospitalization
requirement bears any significant relationship to maternal health; however on
cross examination, the State demonstrated that certain maternal health risks
are involved.

..

I

•

•

No. 81-746, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
No. 81-854, Seguin and Black v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1)

Can the City of Akron require that minors

under 15 obtain consent from their parents or a judge before obtaining an
abortion (or at least require that parents be notified).
(2)

Can the City of Akron require that physicians provide certain

information before obtaining consent to perform the abortion.l
(3)

Can the City require that the attending physician make certain

disclosures about the risks of the abortion technique. to be employed, or does
this invade the realm of the physician and encumber the decision to have an
abortion.
(4)

Can the City require that there be a 24-hour •cooling-of£- period

between the time a woman consents to an abortion and the time it is performed.
(5)

Can the City require that the remains of the abortive fetuses be

disposed of in a •humane• manner, or is that term void for vagueness.
FAcrS:

Petrs are the City and parents of minor daughters.

At trial, the

DC invalidated the requirement of parental notice to parents of 15-17 year
olds, and the requirement of parental consent to those 14 and under.

For

15-17 year olds, CA 6 reversed the DC on grounds that no party had standing
(i.e., an emancipated, mature female) to challenge that provision.

Although

the parents appealed this issue to CA 6, the City did not. Because the parents
may now have daughters that exceed 15 years of age, this issue may not
properly be before this court.2
lResps argue that petrs made certain concessions in their brief to CA 6
regarding the constitutionality of the requirement that physicians provide
certain specified information to patients prior to performing abortions.
Petrs have not replied to this argument.
2Petrs argue that not all of the daughters in this litigation exceed 15
years of age (Petrs' Reply Br. at 2). However the testi.Jrony upon which they
rely (as reprinted on the following page) is less than dispositive of this
issue.

2

Q:

And what are their ages?

This reply to Respondents' Consoli-

A:

15, through 8

dated Br i e f ·.in Op p o s i t ion to Ce r t i or a r i

Q:

Do you have any
childbearing age?

A:

Yes,

I NTRODUCT Ia-.l

i n No s • 8 1 - 7 4 6 and

8 1- 8 54

i s s ubm i t ted

by Petitioners

in No. 81-854 to respond

to new matter

raised by the respondent

clinics

and

to

clarify

the

have

I

children

of

daughter

of

one

14-1/2 •. ·
- - ----

Q:

confusion

' ''
- engendered by the consolidated response.

A:
( Tr •

Vo 1ume VI I ,

at

49 )

( emp h a s 1s

. ARGLMENT

added)
Petitioner Black also testified that
Part IV of respondents' consolidated

.

·her

daughter

opposition to the petition in No. 81-854

time

raises a mootness

children.

-

etitioners.
t

he

a r g ume n t

issue not briefed by

The reason is very simple:
t ha t

t his

case

has

been

of

who

trial

was

was

fourteen

only

Notably,

her

one

at
of

the

on 1y one

children

the

time

mooted by the passage of time Is simply

had reached childbearing

w rong.

499}

It goes · without

elght

fourteen-year-

o 1d daught e r was
who at

the

of

age.

of

her

trial
( J .A.

saying that

her

other children were younger.

Q:

Do you have any children?
Thus, there is nothing ln the record
four children.
below

to

indicate

that

se

1s

•

•

- 2 -

Moreover, it is arguable that a state court could give the statute at
issue a construction that is consistent with decisions of this Court, i.e.,
H.L.

~ Matheson~Ol s.ct.

1164 {1981) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443

u.s.

622

(1979), permitting a "mature• minor under certain circumstances to be able to
make her own decision regarding abortions.
have not done so.

However to date the Ohio courts
I

And this Court has expressed an inclination to defer to

state courts under such circumstances.

Bellotti,

s~ra,

at 1436-51.

•

•

No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron

QUESTIONS PRESENI'ED:

(1)

Can the City of Akron require that all

abortions after the first trimester- be performed in hospitals rather than in
clinics such as those operated by petr.
DISCUSSION:

This case is curve-lined with Nos. 81-746 and 81-854 (see

-

preceding pages) which, when considered with those two cases, presents both
the consent and hospitalization issues, with the potential pitfalls noted.
------------

__.-

-

""'

r

Should the Court desire to reach only the hospitalization issue, this case
might be an appropriate vehicle.

-

However, because this case presents precisely the same issue, as in
Gary-Northwest Indiana WOmen's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894,
896-902 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd sub. nom.

Gary-Northwest Indiana WOmen's

services, Inc. v. Orr, ___ u.s. ___, 101 S.Ct. 2012, 68 L.Ed. 2d 321 (1981),
controlled by the Court's summary disposition there affirming
the DC's decision that second trimester hospitalization requirements are
constitutional.

•

No. 81-1255, Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas v. Ashcroft

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

Petrs challenge that portion of the Mo. abortion

statute requiring consent of a parent or juvenile court approval before an
unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion.
FACTS:

(See No. 81-1623)

Petrs are two corporations
operating abortion
/

clinics.
DISCUSSION:
strained.

The arguments presented by petrs herein are somewhat

They address their complaint not to the statute as interpreted by

CA 8, but rather to an objectionable interpretation they give to the statute
themselves.

Essentially, they ignore the CA 8 decision which invalidated the

requirement of parental notice even when consent has been provided by a court;
and they argue that the CA 8 interpretation of the statute which makes it
conform to the dictates of this Court is invalid; and that without that
interpretation, the statute violates decisions of this Court.
This case seems unworthy of plenary review, but should probably continue
to be held pending disposition of the lead case, whichever that might be.

•

No. 81-1623, Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1)

Whether a state may constitutionally require

that every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy be performed in a hospital.
(2)

Whether a state may constitutionally require that a second physician
I

attend the performance of an abortion of a •viable fetus.•
(3)

Whether a state may constitutionally require that a tissue sample be

taken of every abortion and be submitted to a qualified pathologist for a
pathology report.
( 4)

Whether the DC erred in calculating its award of attorneys fees.

FACTS:

In June 1979 Missouri enacted a comprehensive statute dealing

with abortion.

Resps, two corporations operating abortion clinics and two

physicians who regularly perform abortions in the clinic and elsewhere, filed
suit in the DC (WD Mo.) challenging as unconstitutional certain sections of
the new law.
above.

The three sections at issue are listed in Questions 1, 2 and 3

At trial, the DC invalidated the requirement that abortions beyond the

first trimester be performed in a hospital.
further factual development, affirmed.

T~e

The CA, after remanding for
State Attorney General is seeking

cert to CA 8.
DISCUSSION:

The hospitalization issue appears to be squarely presented

in this case; it is a state-imposed requirement.
is absent, despite cross-petr's claim.
grant limited to Question 1.

The parental consent issue

Consideration might be given to a

'

..

•

CONCLUSION: This is a preliminary memorandum which necessarily assumes
certain concerns of the Conference. If, however, the Conference might specify
the issue or issues for which it has the greatest concern, this Office will
respond with a more detailed examination.
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January 8, 1982 Conference ry~ ~ vf~
List 5, Sheet 2
~" ( ~ ~ /.,-------).

~ -746-CF~

Cert to CA6 {Lively,
Kennedy [con & dis] , Gibson)
CITY OF AKRON {city that enacted abortion regulations)

v.

/l--L~~~~·

~h_ ~~ C~ "k

AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH, INC., et al. {abortion clinics)

Federal/Civil

z.

J

y.J

3)

Timely

4-1-J~~~~~

F~~ )loJVLfzo~ ~
~~~~~-~~

No. 81-854-CFX

Cert to CA6 {Lively,

~ ~

Kennedy [con & dis] , Gibson)
~

SEGUIN & BLACK {intervenor parents of daughte ~ k

j:~~~~~- ~

· '--1.-

-jA)

r
..

..

.

v.
AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH, INC., et al.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

On a variety of grounds, petrs challenge the

CA6's invalidation of certain of Akron's abortion regulations.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
operate

Akron

abortions

at

abortion
the

municipal abortion

clinics

clinics

Three corporations that

and

one

challenged

the

regulations.

doctor

who

performs

validity of Akron's
P.eim~tted
.
The De Atwo parents of m1nor

daughters to intervene.
Five Akron abortion regulations are at issue in these
petns.

The

first

requires

------------..

that

mihor's

-under

15 seeking

an

abortion obtain either consent of a parent or "an order from a
court having
formed or

jurisdiction over her

induced

"

that the abortion be per-

Section 1870.05(B) . 1

The second

No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor
pregnant woman under the ---c£9e of - fifteen (15) years without first
having obtained the infor.me<I w_r i tten consent of the minor pregnant
woman in accordance with Section 1870.06 of this Chanpter and
(1) First having · obtained the informed written consent of
one of her parents or h~regal guardian in accordance with Section
1870.06 of this chapter or
(2)
The minor -gnant woman first having obtained an order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be
performed or induced.
(Emphasis added.)

3.
~'-o
provision

requires

the

physician to t-eH a

woman

seeking

an

/'\

abortions

certain

consent. 2

Section 1870.06(B).

that

the

physician

pregnancy

and

1870.06 (C) .

the

statements

detail
abortion

The fourth

and

to

obtain

her

written

The third provision specifies

particular
technique

risks
to

be

associated
used.

with

Section

regulation requires a 24-hour waiting

period between the time the consent is signed and the abortion
is performed.

Section 1870.07.

The fifth provision requires

that the remains of the aborted fetus be disposed of in "a hu-

2 [A]n abortion shall be performed • • . upon a pregnant woman only
after she • • . [has] been orally informed by her attending physician of the foregoing facts, and [has] signed a consent form acknowledging that she • • . [has] been informed as follows:
~(1)

That • . . she is pregnant.
The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of
the conception . • • •
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment
of conception and that therelJas been described in detail
the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the
particular unborn child . . • , including, but not limited
to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including
pain, perception or response, bra1n and heart function,
the presence of internal organs and the presence of external members.
~
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable
of surviving outside of her womb, if more than •
• 22
weeks have elapsed from the time of conception, and that
her attending physician has a legal obligation to take all
reasonable steps to preserve the life and health of her
viable unborn child during the abortion.
(5)
That abortion is a major surgical procedure, which
can result in serious complications, including [various
specific hazards].
(6)
That numerous . • . agencies . • • are available to
provide her with birth control information • . • •
(7)
That numerous . . . agencies • . . are available to
assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of the
child, if she chooses not to have the abortion . • • •

~ (2)

)

4•

..
mane and sanitary manner."

Section 1870.16.

The DC invalidated the first, second, and fifth regulations and upheld the third and the fourth.

On appeal,

the

CA6 stated that the proper standard of review required a twostep analysis:
First, the nature of the particular regulatory
provision must be considered. If it causes no
~
5
"legally significant impact or consequence" on
the right of a pregnant woman, in consultation
J
~
,
with a physician, to choose to terminate her /1-~
pregnancy, it does not raise a constitutional
issue.
Only if the provision does result in such significant impact or consequence
must a second inquiry be made to determine
whether or not the regulatory provision serves
a legitimate and compelling state interest.
If a compelling state interest is found, the
regulation must be examined further to determine whether it imposes an "undue burden" on
the abortion decision, that is, whether it is
sufficiently narrowly drawn.

IJ/s,

The CAG used this analysis to affirm the DC's invalidation of
the

first,

second,

and

fifth

The

regulations.

CA said

the

analysis mandated reversal, however, of the DC's holdings that
the

second and

third

regulations were permissible.

Finally,

the CA affirmed the DC(s ruling that the fifth "humane disposal" requirement

wa~

unconstitutionally vague.

Judge Kennedy dissented in part.

She argued that the

first parental or judicial consent provision could be construed
in a constitutional manner, so long as the "court having jurisdiction"
"would

inquired

not

find

into
section

the

minor's

1870.05 (B)

maturity.

She

unconstitutional

therefore
until

a

5.

mature minor challenges it and until it has been construed by a
lower court."

Petn App 33a.

Judge Kennedy also dissented from

the majority's invalidation of the third regulation, reasoning
that "the information specified in .06(C) be given by a physician does no more than seek to ensure that there is in fact a
true physician-patient relationship even for the woman who goes
to an abortion clinic."
AKRON'S

Id. at 36a.

CONTENTIONS

IN

NO.

81-746:

(1)

The CA6's

two-tiered analysis conflicts with that employed by this Court,
which

requires

only

that

first-trimester

not be "unduly burdensome."
the

first

requirement

(2)

abortion

regulation

It is possible to construe

to accord with constitutional require-

ments by presuming that the state judicial proceeding will inquire into the minor's ability to make a mature informed consent.

The C6 erred by invalidating the provision before it had

been challenged by a minor claiming to be mature or emancipated.

(3)

The

third

regulation

abortion is truly informed.

ensures

that

consent

for

an

The information that the regula-

tion requires doctors to supply is accurate and is not unduly
burdensome to a woman's right to an abortion.

Even if parts of

this regulation are unconstitutional, the DC and CA6 erred by
not severing the valid portions of the regulation in accordance
with expressed legislative

intent.

(4)

The third regulation

was enacted to ensure that the doctor-patient consultation process protected by Roe v. Wade actually takes place.

(5)

The

fourth regulation's 24-hour waiting period is not unduly bur-

6.

..
densome.
the

The requirement strikes a reasonable balance between

State's

important

interest

in ensuring careful consider-

ation of the woman's decision and the woman's right to an abortion.

(6)

The term "humane" is not unconstitutionally vague.

A similar provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Fitz-

u.s.

patrick, 401 F.Supp. 554, 573 (ED Pa 1975), aff'd, 428
(1976).

901

Even if "humane" is vague, the CA6 should have severed

the word from the balance of the section in accord with legislative intent.
PETRS' CONTENTIONS IN NO. 81-854:

(1)

minors are affected by the first regulation.

Only immature

Petrs' daughters

will be harmed if they are left at the mercy of a clinic that
will profit only if the choice is to abort.

The record below

shows that the counselling provided by the clinics is inconsistent

with

minors.

community
The

standards

clinics make

no

mature and immature minors.

for

the

attempt

treatment of
to

immature

distinguish

between

The CA6's invalidation of the pa-

rental/judicial consent option errs in six respects.
minor, mature or immature, challenged the statute.

First, no
Second, the

record establishes that "mature" minors under the age of fifteen

are

extremely

rare.

doctor-patient relationship.

Third,

these

Fourth,

clinics

provide

no

there is no third-party

veto of the abortion decision because the minor inherently is
incapable of making the decision on her own.

Fifth, there is

no third-party veto in any event because a judicial override of
the parents' veto is available under Ohio juvenile court law.

7.

Sixth,

the

Ohio

juvenile

procedure

merely

provides

parental

notice and a opportunity for comment after the jurisdiction of
the TC has been invoked.
"third-party"
Planned

This is not the sort of impermissible

veto

of

a

Parenthood

v.

Danforth,

Bellotti v. Baird, 443

"woman's"

u.s.

abortion

662 (1979)

standard of review in abortion cases
absurd results.

u.s.

428

proscribed
52

by

(1976),

(Bellotti II).

and

(2)

The

is unclear and leads to

Roe v. Wade's seemingly absolute language is

inappropriate for regulations, like the first one in this case,
that enhance a woman's freedom of choice in seeking an abortion.

Even if strict scrutiny applies, Akron has a compelling

interest

in

assuring

that

physician-patient

relationships

in

fact exist, and that patients are provided the counseling they
now lack in abortion clinics.
RESPS' CONSOLIDATED CONTENTIONS:

(1)

Only the inter-

venors, and not the defendants, appealed the constitutionality
of the first regulation at issue.
the CA6 conceded
(4), and

(5)

the

Moreover, the defendants in

unconstitutionality of

of the second regulation.

subsections

( 3) ,

The defendants there-

fore should not be heard to argue in favor of either of these
portions of the challenged regulations.

(2)

There is no con-

flict between the CA6 decision and any other CA decision.

The

CAl, CA6, CA7, and CAS agree about the constitutional standard
of review and about the
second,

third,

and fourth

invalidity of regulations similar

to

regulations at issue in this case.

The CA6's standard of review is consistent with the decisions

8.

of this Court, as is the CA6's invalidation of both the first
blanket parental notification provision and the second, third,
and

fourth

provisions,

which

interfere with

the professional

judgment of the physician in the abortion context.
third,

and

fourth

provisions

are

also

The second,

incompatible with

the

doctrine of informed consent, which seeks to preserve the physical and psychological integrity of the patient by allowing her
(rather

than the State)

the treatment process.

a significant degree of control over
(3)

Standards for determining the sev-

erability of particular provisions are well established.
severability issues
cance.

(4)

The

in this case are not of general signifi-

The vagueness of the term "humane" is not an issue

meriting plenary review.

The statutory use of the term "hu-

mane" summarily affirmed in Fitzpatrick, 428

u.s.

901, occurred

in the context of an enabling statute pursuant to which regulations

had

not

yet

agreement

within

access

abortions.

to

been

the

adopted.

CAs

(5)

concerning

The

There

is

remarkable

regulations

announcement of

restricting

new and

different

standards by this Court could serve to introduce uncertainty
where

none

now

exists.

challenge on the CA6's

(6)

Intervenor

intervenors'

claims

moot;

DISCUSSION:

u.s.

their

regulation,

The lapse of time has

each

of

their

daughters is now at least seventeen years of age.
Mills v. Johnston, 259

focus

invalidation of the first

which applies only to minors under 15.
rendered

parents

described

See Atherton

13, 15 (1922).

First Regulation.

Review of

the CA6 's

9.

invalidation of
that Akron

did

the

first

not

appeal

regulation
that

is

issue,

impeded

by

the

fact

see Petn App at

lla,

while the intervenors--who did appeal this point to the CA6-e>...""'

now have daughters whose age makes the under-15 year old regulation inapplicable to them.

This does seem to moot the ques-

--------------------

tion as to the only party that raised it in the CA6. 3
Mills, 259

u.s.

at 15-16.

Atherton

Nevertheless, the issue was briefed

fully before the CA6, which decided the question.

Resps cite

no authority for the proposition that an issue that was argued
and decided in the CA cannot be raised in this Court by a party
that did not participate in this phase of the argument.
Assuming

that

the

question

is

properly

before

the

Court, the validity of the first regulation initially depends
on whether

its judicial authorization alternative, see note 1

supra, satisfies two criteria:

the judicial inquiry must not

withhold an abortion from a minor found mature and fully competent to make this decision independently, and the judicial inquiry must not require
. parental. notification in every instance,
without affording the

p~egnant

minor an opportunity to receive

an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough
to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interest.
See H.L.

v. Matheson, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1176-77

{1981}

{opinion

3 Intervenor Seguin has another daughter of unknown age.
Unless petrs provide information about her age in a future
reply brief, I think she must be ignored in deciding this
mootness issue.

•

10.

of Powell, J.,

joined by Stewart, J.};

id. at 1186-1194

(dis-

sent of Marshall, J., joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun};
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979)
rality opinion).

(Bellotti I I)

(plu-

Although the Akron regulation does not speci-

fy that judicial inquiry under its terms is to be tailored in
this fashion, see note 1 supra, it is conceivable that a state
court could save the statute by imposing such a construction on
(Neither

its language.

the DC nor

the CA6 engaged

in a de-

tailed construction of this provision before invalidating it.
See petn app lla-12a & 9la-92a.)

But while the Court previous-

ly has expressed its desire that federal courts defer to state
courts when so requested under such circumstances, see Bellotti
v. Baird, 428

u.s.

132, 146-51 (1976)

(Bellotti I), it does not

appear that petrs ever requested that the federal courts below
abstain or certify the construction issue to state courts.
id.

at 134

(appellants moved for

abstention).

Cf.

Petrs do not

urge explicitly that the federal courts should have abstained
sua sponte.

Given this posture

(as well as the absence of an

allegation that all minors under 15 are insufficiently mature
to make abortion decisions on their own, see Seguin petn at 38
'

'•

k

(mature minors under 15 are extremely rare)), the CA6's holding
on this point

is

,.

in accord with settled law--to the extent that

any such thing exists in this troubled realm.

-

None of resps are 15 yeal- olds, mature or otherwise.
There consequently is a question as to resps' standing to raise
.
...
this facial constitutional attack on the first Akron regula-

•
tion.

11.

See Matheson, 101 s.ct. at 1169 ("We need not reach that

question [of facial unconstitutionality] since [appellant] did
• . that she or any member of her class is mature

not allege .

/

or emancipated.") & n.l2.

See also id. at 1174-75 (Powell, J.,

joined by Stewart, J., concurring in standing holding).
found

that

The DC

the physician plaintiff had standing to challenge

this provision because his patients include minors below the
age of 15.

Petn app 56a.

Neither the DC nor the CA6 explained

how the doctor's interest conveyed standing to challenge these
burdens on minors' abortion rights.

Notwithstanding this omis-

sion, the decision may well be correct.
tion Services Int '1,
tives

seller

has

431 U.S.

standing

678,

See Carey v. Popula-

682-84

(1977)

(contracep-

to assert constitutional rights of

buyers); Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190, 194-96 (1976)

(seller of

beer has standing to raise equal protection claims of 18- to
21-year old males).
(1973)

See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 u.s. 179, 188,

("The physician is the one against whom these criminal

statutes direct operate in the event he procures an abortion
that does not meet the statutory exception and conditions.").
There is no CA conflict alleged.

'1

mend

that

the Court

deny cert on

all

I

therefore recom-

issues

regarding

this

first regulation.
Second, Third, and Fourth Regulations.

Petrs identify

no conflicts with respect to the second, third, and fourth Akron regulations.

The same is true with respect to the petrs'

claims that the CA6 failed to sever the various provisions at

•

•

r

I

issue.

12.

I recommend denial until such time as the accord among

the CAs is broken.
Fifth Regulation.
regulation

The CA6's holding

that

(requiring "humane" disposal of a fetus)

the

fifth

is an im-

permissibly vague definition of a criminal act is distinguishable

from

this

Court's

summary

affirmance

of

Fitzpatrick.

First, the Fitzpatrick DC did not purport to engage in a vagueness analysis.

Rather

it upheld the requirement of a "humane

disposal" against a challenge that the requirement unconstitutionally burdened the woman's right to an abortion.
Second, Fitzpatrick concerned an enabling statute providing that "[t]he department shall make regulations to provide
for
572.

the humane disposition of dead

fetuses."

401 F.Supp.

at

The DC ruled:
Of course, a regulation that requires expensive burial may very well invade the privacy
of the pregnant woman and burden her decision
concerning an abortion. However, no such regulation has been adopted to date pursuant to
Section 5(c), and we find that this section is
not unconstitutional on its face.
We, of
course, do not foreclose a future challenge to
any unconstitutional regulation adopted pursuant to this section.
Id. at 573.

By contrast, this case involves a final statute that requires
promulgation of no further regulations before criminal liability can be imposed.
The CA6's decision to invoke void-for-vagueness analy-

•

•

..

13.

sis nonetheless was summary and peculiar, and it did result in
the invalidation of a provision of local law.

My judgment is

that, even so, this issue does not warrant further review.

But

if the CA6's action troubles the Court, it may be worth holding
this case for City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, No. 80-1577
(argued

11/10/81),

to see whether

general standard for
sis.

that opinion articulates a

application of void-for-vagueness analy-

If so, the possibility of summary reversal on the basis

of that case and Fitzpatrick will be available.

Plenary review

is also a possibility, but I have some doubt whether this issue
warrants the resources.
RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response.
12/21/81

Wiley

Opinion in petn
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MEMO TO FILE
81-746 and 81-1172 Akron Abortion Cases
The purpose of this memo is to outline the
provisions of the sections of the Akron ordinance at issue,
together with the holding of CA6.
Section 1870.05(B): The Consent Provision
As to women under 15 years of age, it is a
criminal offense for a physician to perform an abortion
without first obtaining the "informed written consent" of
one of her parents or her legal guardian "in accordance with
§1870.06, or having obtained an order from a court having
jurisdiction.
The briefs state that the juvenile court is the
only one having jurisdiction, and that Ohio law requires all
complaints filed in such courts to be served on the minor's
- ~~~~
parents. Thus, the effect of §1870.05(B)I\ is at least to 4-;t/JU~require notification of parents.

For reasons I stated in

Bellotti II - and possibly in H.L. v. Matheson, I probably
would not approve of this.
There also is a standing question with respect to
considering this section of the ordinance.

Respondent's

brief (p. 45) argued that this section is not properly
before the Court because no party with Article III standing
appealed to CA6.

The only parties who appealed were parents

(not the city or city officials) whose interest was
unrelated to any specific case.

2.
Section 1870.06(B):

Specific Advice Required.

"In order to ensure that the consent" is
"informed", physicians are forbidden to perform any abortion
until the woman (and one of her parents in the absence of a
court order) is advised by her physician on a number of
specific matters.
petitioner's brief.

See the full provision pp. 6 and 7,
Included in the required advice is the

"unborn child is a human life from the moment of
conception"; that the "unborn child may be viable if more
than 22 weeks have elapsed; that an abortion is a "major
surgical procedure that can result in • • . hemorrhages,
peforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances,
sterility, etc., etc.".
The opinions below, and briefs on the "abortion"
side of this case leap on this provision with special fury.
So do the briefs on behalf of medical societies.

See

particularly brief of the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (hereafter the "College"), a well written
Wilmer, Cutler brief, at p. 8, et seq.

This brief

emphasizes the uniqueness of each patient, and the necessity
that "a physician must be able to exercise discretion in
determining the amount, nature and mode of presentation of
the information" for the particular patient and her
circumstances.
I am inclined to agree with the foregoing, but
construe it to recognize that a physician's advice is

3.

required.

This is absent in so many clinics.

See

Simopoulos.
It is to be noted, in this case, that the District
Court found that:
"A patient's contact with the physician who
is to perform the abortion procedure usually
occurs when she is taken into the operating
room. At that time, the physician reviews
the patient's medical chart and asks if she
has any questions. The doctor then performs
a pelvic examination. If [this is negative]
. • • the abortion usually will then be
performed." App. 46a-47a; also quoted in
petitioner's brief p. 8.
Unless CA6 rejected this finding, it appears that
one or more of these clinics (there are three of them in
this case that together performed 5280 aobrtions in 1977}
provide no real consultative information and advice.

See

also what happened in Simopoulos.
I would affirm CA6's holding with respect to the
invalidity of this section, but make clear - in accordance
with the College's brief - that the physician must provide

qualified physicians.

Section 1870.06(C}:

Information as to "Particular" Risks.

This section, expanding on the advice required by
1870.06(B} requires that the woman, and one of her parents
or guardian be informed of "the particular risks associated
with her pregnancy and the abortion technique to be

4.
employed, providing a general description of the medical
instructions to be followed subsequent to the abortion.
This also was invalidated by CA6, though the DC
sustained its constitutionality.

Apparently the debate was

over whether the advice should be given by a physician
rather than some other person in the clinic.

Apart from

this, I would think requiring information on the "risks
associated" with the abortion need not be included in a
statute, although a responsible physician would identy them.
The brief of the College indicates that the risks are not as
serious as a tonsilectomy or anywhere near as serious as an
appendectomy.

Secttion 1870.07:

24 Hours Delay.

Except in the event of an emergency need for an
abortion, this section prohibits this action "until 24 hours
have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of
her parents or legal guardian, have signed the consent form
required by §1870.06."

The physician must certify

accordingly.
The DC sustained the 24-hour provision, but CA6
held it unconstitutional for the uninformative reason that
it "causes a legally significant impact or consequence on
the abortion decision, it therefore cannot be applied to
first trimester abortions".

CA6 seems to be a bit carried

away by inquiring whether a regulation causes a "legally

5.

significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision".
This is not a self-evident analysis.

Section 1870.16:

Humane Disposal.

Requires that the "remains of the unborn child be
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner".

Held

unconstitutional by both courts, by the DC on vaguenss.

* * *
Respondent's Brief - Second Trimester Abortions.
Respondents in this case are the three clinics in
Akron, and a Dr. Bliss.

They have filed cross petitions {I

am not clear at the moment as to the issues thereof), with a
supporting brief prepared by a professor at the ClevelandMarshall Law School, and lawyers from the ACLU.
The first section of this brief - and apparently
the primary interest of respondents - is the limitation on
second trimester abortions.
Section 1870.03, according to respondent's brief
{I should read the section) requires that every abortion
performed subsequent to the end of the first trimester be
performed in a hospital.

This is defined to mean "a general

hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or
obstetrics which is accredited by the the joint commission

,,
Osteopathic Association.

on the accreditation of hospitals, or by the American
Respondent's brief relies on

statistics and evidence to the effect that no arbitrary line
can be drawn between the trimesters, and contends that

6.

"early second trimester abortions are safely performed in
outpatient clinics".

It is stated that only 17% of the

public hospitals, and 34% of the private hospitals, do
abortions at all.

And at the time of trial "second

trimester abortions were not available in hospitals in
Akron", with the result that "ambulatory facilities" have
been developed to meet this special need, and that over 70%
of all abortions were performed in free standing clinics.
The College's brief, somewhat more restrained,
argued that the limitation on all secondary trimester
abortions is unconstitutionally "overbroad".

Apparently

recognizing that there is language in Roe v. Wade that
supports a holding of validity, the College brief emphasizes
language in Wade that talks of "present medical knowledge",
and reads our cases as having "declined to permit the states
to establish a specific point of presumptive viability",
rather it is said that this Court has deliberately "left the
[compelling] point flexible for anticipated advancements in
medical skill".

Citing Colauti v. Franklin, 439 U.S., at

387, with a see also to Roe, 410 U.S., at 159-161: and
Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 61, 64.

The College brief argues that since Roe "medical
knowledge has progressed dramatically".

In this connection,

the College's brief states that the increased safety of
abortions after the first trimester results from the
"widespread adoption of dialation and evacuation (D&E)", now

7.
an accepted technique for second trimester abortions".

Br.

21.

It is argued also that "most second trimester
abortions are as safe as or safer than childbirth has led to
a change in the views of many physicians regarding the
advisability of hospitalization for all second trimester
abortions".

Br. 23.

The College refers to its "Standards

for Obstetric-Gynecological Servides", as stating:
"[In] a hospital based or in a free standing
ambulatory surgical facility, or in an
outpatient clinic meeting criteria required
for a free standing surgical facility,
abortions should be limited generally to 18
weeks from the last menstral period". Br.
23, 24.

/ "1 ~ w~. ~

IJ-y

In footnote 65, p. 24, the College's standards are

---

set forth for "free standing surgical facilities":
..
-~
"ACOG, Standard for Obstetric-Gynecologic
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) ("ACOG
Standards"). ACOG's standards for 'freestanding surgical facilities' recommended
that they 'be licensed to conform to
requirements of state or federal legislation' l
and 'maintain the same surgical, anesthetic,
and personal stanaar,Qs as recommended for
hospitals.' Id. at 52. 'Surgical procedures
may be performed in those facilities under
general or regional block anesthesia when it
is expected that the postoperative recovery
will permit discharge on the same day. There
should be a written policy requiring the
medical staff to provide for prompt emergency
treatment or hospitalization in the event of
an unanticipated complication.'"

I am tentatively inclined to agree with the
College.

This still leaves the question (that I have not

8.

seen briefed thoroughly, whether the physician must
determine that viability has not commenced before any
abortion may be performed except to preserve the life of the
mother.

~~r

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Nov. 22, 1982

Abortion Cases
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to
select for me, including also the brief by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

As I am sure

you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit
overwhelming.

I have not tried to sort out which ones we

granted, or whether we took them across the board.
A primary objective of the Court at this time, as
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the
flow of litigation into the Courts.

The professors' brief

with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of •balancing".
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally
•at will".

In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia

case), there always will be licensed physicians who will
make enormous profits out of what have been described as
•abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief
fairly states some of our holdings.

Perhaps the SG goes too

far the other way.
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several
of the major issues in these cases:

(

•

Informed Consent Requirement

2.

Danforth recognized that this is not an undue
burden per se.

The Akron provision is unduly burdensome

because it imposes extensive requirements as to exactly what
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her
•informed• consent.
As to the consent requirement with respect to
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of
the minor.

In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the

juvenile court to notify the parents.

Under my opinions in

Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid.

24 Hours Delai(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri)
Although I do not recall (without checking) a
court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our
standards.

This normally can be left to the physician,

provided there is some assurance that the physician will
adequately inform the woman.

With respect to immature

minors, there should be time to assure informed consent.

We

have never considered the extent of a doctor's
responsibility in determining whether a minor is mature.

I

suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors

3.
of tender age (under 15) that an independent decision maker
determine maturity and best interest issues.

Such a

requirement inevitably would produce some delay.

Second Trimester Abortions
My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line,
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a
fetus.

In Akron, respondents argue that "early second

trimester abortions are safely performed [even in]
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any
"arbitrary line between trimesters".
The American College seems to agree, relying on
the argument that "medical knowledge [since Doe] has
progressed dramatically", particularly in the use of D&E
procedures.

Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case

persuaded CAB (and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure
invariably destroys the fetus.

Thus, in view of the

compelling state interest once viability exists a state
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be
made by a physician.
As the College brief relies on "current medical
knowledge", it would appear that it agrees a qualified
physician is the only person likely to possess such
knowledge, and therefore the viability decision cannot be
delegated to a less qualified person.

•

4.

Free Standing Clinics
A major issue, in view of the extensive use of
clincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would
be lawful.
I am favorably inclined toward the views in the
amicus brief of the College.

See pages 23, 24.

I

particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities"
as requiring them to "maintain the same surgical,
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as
recommended for hospitals."

Clearly, I would think, clincis

should be regulated and approved by state law, and
periodically inspected.
It is not clear whether the College would require
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions.

The

record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of
the College's standard as to abortions.

Take a look, and

identify (or xerox) anything helpful.

* * *
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of
tentative views.

When we go into Conference on three cases,

involving three different sets of regulations, it will be
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you,
identifying the issue and the case.
reconcile these prior to Conference.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

Where we differ, we can
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re:

Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., et al., No. 81-746;
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et al. v.
City of Akron, et al., No. 81-1172;
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Inc.,
et a l. v. Ashcroft, et al., No. 81-1255;
Ashcroft, et al. v. Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Inc., et al., No. 81-16 2 3

2•

.•,'

Issues Pr esented
I.

Simopoulos (No. 81-185)

(1) Did the Va. courts unconstitutionally apply their criminal
abortion law where lack of necessity for the abortion was not al,

~-

"""'"""-=

j

leged in the indictment, not addressed in the prosecution's case,
and---------------------not ruled upon by the TC?
(2) Must petr's conviction be reversed as violative of the due
process clause where the entire prosecution case presented no evidence that any act of petr in fact caused the demise of the fetus,
and the sole prosecution medical witness admitted the lack of
evidence?
(3) Does Va.'s mandatory hospitalization requirement abridge
the rights of privacy and due process by unduly restricting access
to 2d-trimester abortions, criminalizing safe nonhospital practice,
and delegating to hospitals the authority to ban such abortions
altogether?
II.

Akron

(No. 81-746)
(1) Is the state's interest in maternal health such that it may
regulate abortion in a reasonable manner that is not unduly burdensome, even during the 1st trimester of pregnancy?
(2) May states require minors under the age of 15 to obtain
judicial authorization or parental consent?
(3) May states require that the attending physician personally
inform the patient of facts relating to her pregnancy, the abortion
procedure, fetal characteristics, and agencies available to assist
her?

3.

(4) May st
, -_

onally to counsel the

require the physician

patient about the risks of the abortion technique to be used?
(5) May states require that the abortion patient wait 24 hours
between giving her informed consent and the performance of an
abortion?
(6)

Is the term "humane" as it relates to the disposal of fe-

tuses in §1870.16 of the Akron ordinance void for vagueness; and if
so, is the term severable from the balance of the section in accordance with the City Council's express intent that the provision is
severable?
(No. 81-1172)

(cross-appeal)

(1) Did this Court's summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Service, Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (NDind. 1980),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v.
Orr, 451

u.s.

934 (1981), compel the CA6 to uphold an Akron ordinace

mandating that abortions after the 1st trimester of pregnancy be
performed in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals?
(2)

Is the requirement that all 2d-trimester abortions be per-

formed in hospitals, regardless of the technique used or the stage
of gestation, unconstitutional because it unnecessarily burdens women needing such abortions and their physicians, and is not narrowly
drawn to further legitimate health interests?
III.

Ashcroft (Mo. statute)

(No. 81-1255)
Did the CA8 err in upholding the constitutionality of Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§188.028.1, 188.028.2 (1), (3), (4), (5)

&

(6) by construing them

4.

oval of one parent, or o

t o requ ire th e
- ., -

he juvenile court for

an unemancipated minor under 18 yrs of age, to terminate her pregnancy; provided (1) that the juvenile court first determines that
the granting of her petn for majority rights for the purposes of
consenting to the abortion is unjustified, and (2) that the juvenile
court determines that finding the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and granting judicial consent to the abortion is
unjustified--even though such interpretation is contrary to the
plain language of the challenged statute?
(No. 81-1623)

(cross-petn)

(1) May Mo. require that every abortion performed subsequent to
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital?
(2) May Mo. require that a tissue sample be taken of every
abortion and submitted to a qualified pathologist for a pathology
report?
(3) May Mo. require the attendance of a 2d physician, in addition to the primary surgeon, before an abortion of a viable fetus
may be performed?
(4) May an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42

u.s.c.

§1988, be proportioned to reflect accurately the extent to which a
pltf prevails?
Background
I.

Simopoulos

Simopoulos is a licensed gynecologist.

P.M., who was 17 years

old and 5 1/2 months pregnant, came to Simopoulos and requested an
abortion.

In his clinic, Simopoulos injected saline solution into

P.M.'s amniotic cavity.

She went to a motel room and two days later

5 .

deliver ed th e fe

und er

Simopoulos was convic

va.

Cod e §18.2-

71 for performing a 2d-trimester abortion outside a hospital and
appealed to the Va. S.Ct.
Simopoulos first argued that the indictment was defective be~
cause the state did not assume the burden of pleading and proving
lack of medical necessity for the abortion.

The Va. S.Ct. pointed

___

out that §18.2-71 makes no mention of I)
medical necessity "'when defining an illegal abortion, but instead establishes it as a
a later section, §18.2-74.1.

a.-

defense~

In appt's view, shifting the burden of

proof to deft violates United States v. Vuitch, 402

u.s.

62 (1971),

but the Va. S.Ct. distinguished Vuitch, finding that this Court in
that case construed lack of medical necessity to be an element of
the crime.

Here, once deft invokes the medical necessity defense,

the state has the burden of negating medical necessity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the Va. S.Ct. also found that there was sufficient evidence that appt had destroyed the fetus.

Simopoulos acknowledged

that h e administered saline solution to terminate the pregnancy;
P.M. testified that appt told her that the fetus was born dead; and
a medical examiner also reported that the fetus was born dead.

The

court concluded that, in the absence of evidence of any other causative factor, the evidence was sufficient to show that the saline
solution injection destroyed the fetus.
~

l(

~~

~

~Simopoulos's

challenge to the hos~ t ::_requirement, §18.2-73,

also unpersuasive.

In Roe v. Wade, 410

u.s_.

113 (1973)

(w/POW-

--

ELL, J.), the Court recognized that the state's interest in the
mother's health becomes compelling at approximately the end of the

s~s~-

~~

)/~· ~

J~~ :.\AI

"1

!G

Court

lst trimester.

~c·i if::lly

6.

stat.

"Examples of permis-

'\

sible state regulation .•• are requirements ••• as to the facility in

----?

which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be
hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-

.----..-

hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like."
Id., at 163.

The Va. S.Ct. thus found that the hospitalization re-

uirement is reasonably related to the state's interest in protecting the mother's health.

Three corporations that operate Akron abortion clinics and one
doctor who performs abortions at the clinics challenged the validity
of Akron's municipal abortion regulations.

Six Akron abortion regu-

lations are at issue:
1.

Parental Consent.

The first requires that minors under 15

seeking an abortion obtain either consent of a parent Q! "an order

--

....----__

r"

"'

from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be perI

formed or induced."

§1870.05{B).

Read in conjunction with §§

1870.06 and 1870.07, §1870.05{B) means that parents must personally
receive all the mandated information at least 24 hours ahead of the
abortion procedure.
2.

Information.

The second provision requires the physician

to "orally infor[m]" a woman of seven "facts" before obtaining her
written consent, which must acknowledge that she has been so informed.

Those seven facts include:

{1) that "according to the best

judgment of her attending physician" she is pregnant;

{2) the number

of weeks elapsed from the probable time of conception, based upon
information provided by her, physical examination, and lab tests;

,

(3) [t]hat

7•

unborn child is a human

fe from the mo-

ment of conception and that there has been described in
detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics of
the particular unborn child at the gestational point of
development at which time the abortion is to be performed,
including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response,
brain and heart function, the presence of internal organs
and the presence of external members[;]
(4) [t]hat her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving outside of her womb, if more than twentyone (22) weeks have elapsed from the time of conception,
and that her attending physician has a legal obligation to
take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and health
of her viable unborn child during the abortion;
(5) [t]hat abortion is a major surgical procedure, which
can result in serious complications, including hemorrhage,
perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she
may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
(6) that numerous agencies are available to provide her with birth
control information; and (7) that numerous agencies are available to
assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of the child, if she
chooses not to have the abortion.

§1870.06(B).

Section 1870.06(C)

requires the doctor to inform the woman of the "particular risks
associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be
employed," and permits the physician to "provide her with such other
information which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her
decision."
3.

Risks.

~

The third provision specifies that the physician

detail particular risks associated with pregnancy and the abortion
technique to be used.

§l870.06(C).

4.

24-Hour Waiting Period. The fourth regulation requires a
-----~---------24-hour waiting period between the time the consent is signed and
the abortion is performed.

§1870.07.

5.

8•

•

Disposal of fetus.

·res

The fifth provision requl

that the

remains of the aborted fetus be disposed of in "a humane and sanitary manner."
6.

§1870.16.

Hospital Requirement.

Section 1870.03 requires that every

abortion performed subsequent to the end of the first trimester be
performed in a hospital.

Hospital is defined by §1870.0l{B) as "a

general hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, or by the American Osteopathic Association."
There is also

a ~ everabili i¥ claus ~.

The DC invalidated {1), {2),

~

{6).

&

§1870.19.

{5) and upheld {3),

{4), and

The city did not appeal the DC's invalidation of the parental

consent provision; only intervenor parents appealed that issue.

On

appeal, the CA6 stated that the proper standard of review required a
two-step analysis:
First, the nature of the particular regulatory provision
must be considered.
If it causes no "legally significant
impact or consequence" on the right of a pregnant woman,
in consultation with a physician, to choose to terminate
her pregnancy, it does not raise a constitutional
issue .••• Only if the provision does result in such significant impact or consequence must a second inquiry be
made to determine whether or not the regulatory provision
serves a legitimate and compelling state interest.
If a
compelling interest is found, the regulation must be examined further to determine whether it imposes an "undue
burden" on the abortion decision, that is, whether it is
sufficiently narrowly drawn.
The CA6 affirm the DC' s invalidation of {1}
{2)

(information) regulations.

{parental consent} and

The CA6 said that the analysis man-

dated reversal, however, of the DC's holdings that the {3}
information} and (4}

{risk

(waiting period} regulations were permissible.

The CA6 also affirmed the DC's ruling that the "humane disposal"

•

9.

requirement was unconstitutionally vague.

Finally, the CA6 upheld

the hospitalization requirement on the basis of this Court's affirmance in Gary-Northwest.
Judge Kennedy dissented in part.

She argued that the first

parental or judicial consent provision could be construed in a constitutional manner, so long as the "court having jurisdiction" inquired into the minor's maturity.

She therefore "would not find

§l87.05(B) unconstitutional until a mature minor challenges it and
until it has been construed by a lower court."

Judge Kennedy also

dissented from the majority's invalidation of (3), reasoning that
"the information specified in .06(C) be given by a physician does no
more than seek to ensure that there is in fact a true physicianpatient relationship even for the woman who goes to an abortion
clinic."
III. Ashcroft (Mo. statute)
A.

(No. 81-1221)

Two corporations operating abortion clinics in K.C. and St.
Louis, and two physicians who regularly perform abortions in the
clinics and elsewhere, brought this suit as a facial challenge to
several Mo. abortion statutes.

The DC held several of the provi~

sions unconstitutional, but upheld others.

One of the provisions

held unconstitutional required parental or judicial consent before a
minor may obtain an abortion.
The CAS reversed in part and affirmed in part.
~

On the issue of

consent for minors' abortions, the court in large part reversed the
DC decision.

Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.1 provides:

•

•

10.

No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a
pregnant woman under the age of eighteen years unless:
(1) The attending physician has secured the informed
written consent of the minor and one parent or guardian;
or
(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received the written informed consent of the minor; or
(3) The minor has been granted the right to selfconsent by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this
section •.• ; or
(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, and ... the minor is having the abortion willingly in compliance with subsection 3 of this
section.
Subsection 2 sets out the procedure to be followed in obtaining judicial consent for the abortion.

The minor must petn the juvenile

court either for "majority rights either for the purpose of consenting to the abortion," in which case the minor can give consent herself, or for a judicial determination that the abortion is in the
best interests of the minor.

Subsection 3 provides that the juve-

nile court shall take evidence, and (4) provides that the court
shall:

(i) grant petn for majority rights;

(ii) find the abortion in

the child's best interests; or (iii) deny the petn.
The DC held §188.028 invalid because it believed the law would
allow the juvenile court to deny permission for an abortion upon
"good cause," even if the minor were sufficiently mature.
construed the statute differently, however.
§188.028.2(4)

The CAS

It held that the

"would initially require the court to find that the

minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her won
decision and that an abortion was not in her best interests."
that interpretation, the law is valid.
B. No. 81-1623 (Cross-Petn)

Under

..
11.
The clinics and doctors also challenged three other Mo. provisions:
1.

Section 188.025 provides that "[e]very abortion performed

subsequent to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in
a hospital."
2.

Section 188.030.3 provides that an abortion of a "viable

unborn child shall be performed ... only when there is in attendance a
physician other than the physician performing ••. the abortion who
shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion."

Section 188.030.1 prohibits any

abortion of a "viable unborn child" unless necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother, and §188.030.2 requires the performing
physician to use the technique most likely to preserve the life of
the unborn child unless that technique will endanger the mother.
Criminal sanctions are imposed for violations of the section.
3.

Finally, §188.047 requires that a "representative sample of

tissue removed at the time of abortion" be sent to a certified pathologist, who must prepare a "tissue report" to be filed with the
statute and the facility in which the abortion was performed.
The DC found the first two of these provisions unconstitutional, but upheld the regulation requiring the pathology report.
1.

The DC found the requirement that abortions be performed in

a hospital after the first trimester of pregnancy to be unconstitutional for two reasons.

First, the requirement did not reasonably

relate to protection of maternal health because the "dilatation and
evacuation" method of abortion (D&E) could be performed safely outside a hospital up until the 18th week of pregnancy; and, because

-

.-

12.
only one Mo. hospital allows use of the D&E method in the second
trimester, the effect of the hospitalization requirement was to render the D&E method virtually unavailable.

Second, because no Mo.

hospital will admit a woman under 18 without parental consent, the
requirement permitted parents to veto a minor's decision to have an
abortion, contrary to Danforth.
2.

The DC upheld the requirement of pathology reports on the

ground that it was rationally related to the state's interest in
regulating standards of medical care.
3.

The DC struck down the second physician provision as

overbroad, because it requires a second doctor even when the fetus
has no reasonable chance of survival, such as when D&E is the only
safe procedure for the woman.
4.

Of other provisions challenged by resps at trial, the DC

upheld two and struck down two.

Nevertheless, the DC awarded resps

attorney's fees, which were apparently based on the full amount of
time resps' attorney's had spent on the case.
The CA affirmed in part and reversed in part.
~

1.

The CA rejected the DC's second rationale for holding un-

constitutional the Mo. hospital requirement, saying that "the fact
that private entities (i.

e~,

the hospitals) impose additional re-

quirements without the State's sanction or insistence cannot affect
the statute's constitutionality."

The CA stated that the proper

inquiry was whether the requirement:

(1) creates a substantial in-

~

terference with and imposes a direct burden on the woman's decision
to have an abortion; and (2) if so, is reasonably related to protection of the woman's health.

The CA found that Roe was not disposi-
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tive, because it was decided before the D&E procedure became widely
used and accepted.

Because it found the record inadequate to decide

these questions, it remanded to the DC.
2.

The CA held the pathology-reports requirement unconstitu-

tional, because it increased the cost of abortion by $10-$40

(there-

by burdening the decision to abort): Mo. does not require submission
of tissue to a pathologist following other medical procedures; and
there was no showing that there were unique medical complications
associated with abortion that necessitated a pathology report in
every case.

While in individual cases a report may be useful (to

indicate possibly fatal disorders, among other things), there is no
reason why physicians should not be able to use their own professional judgment whether such a report is required, as they could do
in connection with every other surgical procedure.
3.

TheCA agreed that the second physician requirement is un-

constitutional, finding that the requirement significantly increased
the costs of abortion, thereby decreasing its availability, and was
not justified in cases where a D&E procedure was used.
4.

The CA held that the clinics were entitled to the full

award of attorney's fees.
On remand, the DC found that:

(1) the D&E procedure was the

safest post-12 week abortion technique currently available, even
when performed outside of a hospital;
forms second-trimester D&E procedures;

(2) only one Mo. hospital per(3) the D&E procedure in a

hospital is significantly more expensive than the same procedure
performed in an outpatient facility; and (4) the second-trimester
hospitalization requirement results in fewer second-trimester abor-

14.
tions being performed than if hospitalization was not required.

On

the basis of these findings, the CA held that the requirement unconstitutionally burdened a woman's decision to seek an abortion, because it was not reasonably related to maternal health.
Summary of the Parties' Contentions
I.

Simopoulos, No. 81-825.
A.

Simopoulos.

The Va. S.Ct. attempted to distinguish Vuitch

by construing the Va. medical necessity
separate, unrelated statute.

ion as if it were a

If the Va. statute is so construed,

and the medical necessity provison is treated as an independent
statutory defense, then §18.2-71 bans all abortions in the first
instance, subject only to the raising of separate defenses, even in
the 1st-trimester abortions.

}

This directly contravenes the holdings

in Roe and makes criminal what is constitutionally protected.
Resp failed to present any medical evidence that petr in fact
caused the demise of the fetus.

The Va. S.Ct. erroneously relied

upon tenuous circumstantial factors and the absence of defense proof
of some other cause to sustain the verdict.

There was insufficient

evidence for a rational trier of fact to find causation beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The va. statutory hospital requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the right of privacy and has negative health consequences.
428

u.s.

See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
52, 76-79 (1976).

This criminal prohibition sharply re-

stricts the availability of abortions after the 1st trimester by
granting a monopoly to the few licensed hospitals that will permit
the post-12 week abortions.

This Court has held other 2d-trimester
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criminal statutes unconstitutional where not reasonably related to a
compelling state interest, not narrowly drawn to effectuate such
interests, or too vague in practice.
of saline

amniocentesis)~

See id., at 75-79 (ban on use

Bolton, 410 U.S., at 193-195 (JCAH accred-

itation required for clinics performing 1st trimester abortions).
B.

Va.

The authoritative construction of the Va. statutes by

the Va. S.Ct. makes it clear that, in this case, the prosecution was
not obligated to prove lack of medical necessity because Simopoulo &---never invoked medical necessity as a defense.

Simopoulos's reliance

on Vuitch is misplaced, because the Va. statute does not presume the
doctor is guilty and under no circumstances is he required to i ntroduce evidence to prove his innocence.

He merely must invoke an ex-

ception to the criminal statute as a defense before the prosecution
becomes obligated to negate affirmatively the exception.
The Va. hospitalization requirement does not limit access to
abortions as Simopoulos would have the Court believe.

Va. does not

requi r e that the procedure be performed exclusively in acute care,
general hospitals, Va. Code §32.1-123, but instead defines "hospital" broadly.

Under the Rules and Regulations For Licensure of Out-

patient Hospitals §20.2.11 (1977), outpatient abortion clinics may
qualify for licensure as hospitals in which 2d-trimester abortions
may be lawfully performed.
Petr does not have standing to challenge the hospitalization
requirement on the grounds of overbreadth.

The abortion in this

case was one performed on a woman in the 22nd week of pregnancy, and
the procedure used may result in substantial complications.

Whether

16.
the statute is overbroad for 15 week abortions using other procedures is not at issue.
II.

Akron, No. 81-746

(~~~)
~~~~

A.

City.

1.

Standard.

The initial question is whether the state's in-

terest in maternal health and wellbeing is such that it may regulate
abortion in a reasonable manner that is not unduly burdensome, even
during the 1st trimester of pregnancy.

In applying a two-tier anal-

ysis to the Akron abortion ordinance, the CA6 effectively held all
1st-trimester regulation to be impermissible.

Decisions of this

Court subsequent to Roe, however, clearly show that states have the
right to regulate abortions performed during the first three months
of pregnancy so long as such regulation does not "unduly burden" a
woman's constitutionally protected right to
2.

ave an abortion.
constitution-

Parental/Judicial Consent.

ality of requiring an unemancipated and immature child under the age
of 15 years to obtain the consent of one parent or her legal guardian, it is important to note that the Akron ordinance provides an
"alternative procedure" whereby authorization can be obtained in
accordance with the constitutional requirements enunciated by this
Court in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
rality opinion)

(POWELL, J.).

(Bellotti II)

(plu-

This section is directed toward mi-

nors, "'as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed consent.'"
411 (1981)

(Utah statute)

147 (1976)

(Bellotti I).

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,

(quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428

u.s.

132,
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3.

Information Requirement.

In reviewing the constitutional-

ity of a state regulation that requires the physician personally to
inform the woman of facts relating to her pregnancy, the abortion
procedure, fetal development, and agencies available to assist her,
the courts below should have looked to see whether the regulation
unduly burdened the woman's right, in consultation with her physician, to decide to terminate her pregnancy.

The requirement is de-

signed to protect the woman by ensuring that her consent will be
truly informed and that it is given only after she has consulted
with her physician.

Such a provision strikes a balance between the

woman's protected right and the state's interest in maternal health,
without unduly burdening her right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.
4.

Risks Information.

Section 1870.06(c)

(informing woman of

abortion risks) furthers a valid state interest in the health of its
citizens and assures that the woman's consent will be truly informed.
5.

24-Hour Waiting Period.

The imposition of a 24-hour wait-

ing period between the time a woman signs the informed-consent form
and the abortion was found by the DC not to burden unduly the
woman's decision to have an abortion.

Once again, the CA6 reversed,

stating that "[s]ince section 1870.07 causes a legally significant
impact or consequence on the abortion decision, it cannot be applied
to first trimester abortions."

The proper standard of review re-

quires that, in considering the regulation, the focus be placed on
the burden imposed on the woman's decision to have an abortion.

•

l B.

B.

Clinics.

1.

Parental Consent.

The city did not appeal the parental

consent requirement, §1870.05(B), to the CA6 and for that reason
should be precluded from appealing it to this Court.

Cf. O'Bannon

v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 783 n. 14 (1980).

On

the merits, §1870.05(B) is unconstitutional because it gives parents
or a court an effective veto over the minor's abortion.

There is no

way for mature minors, or immature minors when an abortion is in
their best interests, to avoid parental consultation, because, as
found by the DC, §l870.05(A) requires the state juvenile court to
notify both parents in every case.
2.

Information.

Sections 1870.06(B) and (C) of this municipal

ordinance dictate what every doctor must tell every woman seeking an
abortion, even in the case of medical emergencies.

The ordinance

mandates that doctors not only communicate medical risks, a requirement already established by state law, but also that doctors orally
present welfare information, medical misinformation, and inflammatory and threatening statements designed to make a woman feel that
abortion is murder.

This puts the doctor in a "straightjacket" and

burdens a woman's decisionmaking process.

Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 67

n.8.
3.

Waiting Period.

The city did not show how this require-

ment, as applied to every woman, would actually promote a compelling, or even legitimate, state interest.

The physical, emotional,

and economic burdens that would be created by forcing every woman to
make two trips and inevitably wait more than 24 hours were established.
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4.

Hospital Requirement.

At the time of trial, no second tri-

mester abortions were available in hospitals in Akron.

The city did

not prove that §1B70.03 was narrowly tailored to promote maternal
health interests, because medical advances have made early 2dtrimester abortions as safe in clinics as in hospitals and, in fact,
the majority of early 2d-trimester abortions in this country are
performed in clinic facilities.

The CA6 upheld §1B70.03 only be-

cause of this Court's summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest, a case
involving a different statute and presented to this Court in a diff erent procedural context.
5.

"Humane" Disposal.

Section 1B70.16 requires "humane and

sanitary" disposal of fetal tissue.

This requirement is void for

vagueness under the due process clause of the 14th A.

Petrs ask

this Court to reconstruct the sentence by severing the word
"humane," but to do so would clearly be contrary to legislative intent.

See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Okla-

homa, 2B6 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
III.
A.
1.

Clinics.

Ashcroft (Mo. Statutes)
No. 81-1255 (Petn)

The clinics contend that the CAB's decision is

directly contrary to Danforth and Bellotti II.

The statute here

contains the same two provisions found fatal to the Mass. law in
Bellotti II: it allows a court to deny permission to a mature minor
and it requires parental notification in every case.

The CAB avoids

this result by rendering a "tortured construction of §188.028" to
make it consistent with the Bellotti II requirements.

2.

State.

•
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A juvenile court cannot deny a petn except for good

cause, which under Mo. law is a cause or reason sufficient in law.
Clearly, after Bellotti II, decided immediately before §1BB.02B was
signed into law, there would be no legally sufficient reason to deny
a petn if evidence demonstrated that a minor was sufficiently mature
to make her own decision.

The CAB's interpretation of "for good

cause" as precluding the court from denying a minor's petn unless
that minor "was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make
her own decision" was reasonable.
B.

No. Bl-1623 (Cross-Petn)

1.

State.

a.

Hospital Requirement.

Mo. contend that the CAB's decision

conflicts with Roe, which indicates that the state's interest in
protecting the health of the mother after the 1st-trimester of pregnancy justifies state regulation as to the facility in which the
procedure is to be performed.

It is impractical to retreat from

Roe's "bright-line test" to rules under which the constitutionality
of 2d-trimester regulation fluctuates with every change in statistics concerning the availability of abortions and the safety of new
abortion techniques.

The CAB should have considered itself bound by

this Court's summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest.
b.

Pathology Reports.

The requirement is rationally related

to the state's interest in preserving maternal health.
c.

2d-Physician Requirement.

The state contends that the

CAB's decision flies in the face of an "overwhelming factual record"
indicating that D&E should never be the procedure of choice at a
sufficiently late date in the pregnancy that the fetus would be via-

ble.

•

The decision also conflicts with Roe, 410

21.

u.s.,

at 163-164,

which concludes that the state's compelling interest in potential
life justifies a proscription against abortion after "viability,"
except when necessary to preserve the mother's life or health.

Ob-

viously this interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the presence of a 2d physician to preserve and care for the potential human life.
2.

Clinics.

a.

The in-hospital requirement for post-1st trimester abor-

tions falls by reason of the state's failure to show any rational
reason for its enactment.

The state failed to demonstrate that the

health interests of women are furthered by such a requirement and,
in fact, the evidence was to the contrary.

Such a requirement im-

poses a severe limitation on access to abortion availability by reason of the near total lack of hospital services available and the
increased expenses incurred.
b.

Requiring the presence of a 2d physician during the abor-

tion of any viable fetus is irrational and overbroad, when the method of abortion used cannot possibly result in a live birth.
c.

The requirement of pathology reports on all abortion speci-

mens at all stages of pregnancy is supported by neither compelling
nor rational reasons.

An abortion procedure is not the type of sur-

gery calling for a pathologist's expertise, does not comport with
medical practice in the field of abortion or medicine in general,
increases the cost of the abortion, and serves no justifiable medical purpose.
Discussion

I.

•

•
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The Right and Permissible Restrictions
~~~·.J4,.~

A.

The Right.

"The constitutional right vindicated in Doe was

the right of a pregnant woman to decide whether or not to bear a
child without unwarranted state interference."
U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)

(emphasis added).

Whalen v. Roe, 429

This Court, however,

has made plain the indispensable role of her physician's best

medi- ~

cal judgment i u considering all factors relating to her pregnancy ~
and in implementing her decision should she choose abortion.
e. g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S., at 192.
410

u.s.,

u.s.

See,

379, 387 (1979): Bolton, 410
1

I(

The abortion decision is a ~edical decision,' see Roe,

at 166, and "statutory restrictions on the abortion proce-

-

____

dures [are] invalid [when] ....they encumbe[r] the woman's exercise of

~

that constitutionally protected right by placing obstacles in the
path of the doctor upon whom she was entitled to rely," Whalen, 429
U.S., at 604 n.33.
B.

Fundamental Rights Test for State Regulation of Abortions.

This Court carefully explained that the liberty recognized in Roe is

~a

"fundamental right."

~~trict

410 U.S., at 152, 155.

To withstand the

judicial scrutiny evoked by such protected interests, any

~ overnmental restriction interfering with a fundamental right "may

~ be

justified only by a 'compelling state interest"' and "must be

narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."

Id. at 155.

against this standard.

Abortion regulations presumably must be tested
See Carey v. Population Services Interna-

tional, 431 U.S. 681, 686, 688 (1977).
C.

Roe Scheme.

The framework for scrutiny of state abortion

regulations envisioned in Roe was that there are only two state in-

•
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terests that become sufficiently compelling at particular points
pregnancy to justify governmental interference with the
cision.

woman~~~~~~~

First, a state's interest in protecting potential life be-

comes sufficiently compelling to justify abortion restrictions designed to further that goal only after viability.

u.s.,

at 163-165.

See Roe, 410

See also Danforth, 428 U.S., at 63-65 ("viabili-

ty" means fetus capable of "'meaningful life outside the mother's
womb'").

At that point, the state can prohibit abortions.

v. Doe, 432

u.s.

438, 446 (1977)

(POWELL, J.).

See Beal

Second, the interest

a state may assert in protecting maternal health matures to "the
'compelling' point" only "at approximately the end of the first trimester" of pregnancy, Roe, 410

u.s.,

at 163, because until that

time--according to the Court's reading of the medical literature
available in 1973--"mortality in abortion may be less than mortality
in normal childbirth," id.
11 (1975)

(p.c.).

See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9,

After that "compelling point," the Constitution

allows states to enact abortion regulations that "reasonably
relat[e] to the preservation and protection of maternal health."
Roe, 410 U.S., at 163.
related").

See Doe, 410

u.s.,

at 194-195 ("legitimately

However, neither the interest in preserving potential

life nor the interest in protecting maternal health is compelling
during the 1st trimester, and thus, throughout that stage, "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."
at 163.

Roe, 410 U.S.,
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The fundamental rights analysis envisioned in Roe is unique in
L

~

-

.............

1

....,.-

--------='

two respects, and both have been the main source of confusion.

To

the extent this Court sees these cases as vehicle's for enunciating
principles that would afford clearer guidance to state legislatures,
both should be addressed (both are presented) •
/.

First, it is possible to read Roe as not permitting any regula-

/ tion by the state in the first trimester.

The Court probably is not

willing to go that far, and other parts of Roe suggest that such a
severely restrictive rule was not meant even then.

Roe made clear

that a woman does not have a right to an abortion "at whatever time,
in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses."
410

u.s.,

at 153.

See Doe, 410

u.s.,

Roe,

at 189 ("[A] pregnant woman

does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her
demand.").

Second, a regulation interfering with a fundamental

right usually must be "narrowly tailored" to further a compelling
state interest, but Roe suggests that, at least in the 2d trimester,
the regulation need be only "reasonably related."

Thus, states have

more discretion in regulating abortions than they do in regulating
other fundamental rights.
D.

Source of Troubles.

These unusual features of fundamental

rights analysis have had two particularly undesirable effect.
First, because the Court has not recognized a compelling state interest in the 1st trimester, the Court has upheld some obviously
desirable 1st-trimester regulation on the rationale that there is no
interference with the right.

Second, because other governmental

interests may be important in the latter trimesters, there is a pull
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toward using the "reasonably related" language much as the Court
would use its rationality test.
The problem is most visible in the cases that attempt to describe when a compelling state interest is necessary.

It is clear,

after Danforth, that not all abortion regulations that apply to the
first trimester are unconstitutional.

Indeed, where there is no

burden, or where the regulation merely makes the physician's work
more laborious or less independent, see Whalen, 429

u.s.,

at 605

n.33, the regulation is evaluated under a relaxed standard of scrutiny, see Matheson, 450

u.s.,

at 411-412 ("the statute plainly

serves the important considerations of family integrity ••• [and] is
reasonably calculated to protect minors.")
432

u.s.,

(emphasis added); Maher,

at 470; Danforth, 428 U.S., at 81 (A recordkeeping re-

quirement, "if not abused or overdone, can be useful to the state's
interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and may be
a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment.")

(emphasis added).

Because the question whether

the strict scrutiny test or the rationality standard applies turns
on whether there is an impact on the abortion decision, much rides
on the conclusion that there is some impact.

The Court has not--to

date--clearly indicated what is a legally significant burden.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-474 (1977)

(POWELL,

J.)

See

("As Whalen

makes clear, the right in Roe v. Doe can be understood only by considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's
interference with it .•••

[T]he right protects the woman from unduly

burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."); Carey, 431

u.s.,

at 678, 688 ("substantially
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limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision");
Bellotti I, 428 U.S., at 147 (Court in Danforth "held that arequirement of written consent ••• is not unconstitutional unless it
unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.").

Compare Danforth,

428 U.S., at 81 (holding that recordkeeping has "no legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the
physician-patient relationship"), with id., at 67 n.8

(cautioning

that detailed informed-consent requirements "might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket
in the practice of his profession").
E.

Present State of Law.

It is clear after Roe that an abso-

lute prohibition, or regulations that effectively preclude the abortion decision, must be supported by a compelling state interest.

~ - ~ee Danforth, 428 U.S.,
/.yl .f t \ af the Court does not

\ 1./J _~
,}". f ,-

abortion decision.

at 67-72.

There are also some regulations

consider to be "regulating" the 1st trimesThere are only th :;e __:,;;;ar examples of when

the Court has found the burden de minimus:
II

(1) The Court in Danforth
\.'

upheld a state statute requiring the 1nformed written consent of a
woman in the first trimester of pregnancy, but which did not specify
the content of

th~

physicians' speech;

(2) the Danforth Court also

~'

Jt

upheld certain recordkeeping and reporting by those providing the

.

abortion; and (3) In Menillo, 423 U.S., at 11, the Court stated:
"Even during the first trimester of pregnancy, ••• prosecutions for
l

~

-

abortions conducted by ~on-physicians infringe upon no realm of per-

-

sonal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interfer-=

ence."

---

It is the gap between these regulations with little impact
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of any sort on the decision and those requiring a compelling state
interest that is troubling.
The SG argues that the state may freely regulate abortions until it "unduly burdens" the abortion decision, only at which point
it must justify its regulation by some compelling state interest.
According to the CA6, however, a court first must determine whether
the regulation is state action imposing
right to obtain an abortion.

~burden

at all on the

The question here is not one of degree

but simply whether the regulation affirmatively imposes any legally
cognizable burden.
curring)

See Whalen, 429 U.S., at 607 {Brennan, J., con-

{absent a deprivation of constitutionally protected liber-

ty, state need not show law necessary to further compelling state
interest).

In sum, the CA6, and others, consider the "unduly bur-

densome" label to apply to those regulations that cannot be justi-

7

fied by even a compelling state interest.
The ) A6's pos! tion {and the pos ~; ion o~ law prof : ssors'

~

brief) is ~ntellectually ~ sati ~ng in that it denies the burden, ~

fo ~

regardless of degree, that having a doctor, signing a consent
etc. obviously have.
one of degree.

----.........

The SG is clearly correct that the issue is

For the CA6, the funding and parental consent cases

are simply two exceptions from its analysis. The SG's analysis is
troubling, however, because it uses the funding and parental consent
cases to show how much burden the states can impose without "unduly
burdening" the right to make the abortion decision.

This Court has

clearly applied a less stringent test to abortion laws only in the
I

public funding cases, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 {1980)
(w/POWELL, J.)

{federal government); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448

u.s.

28.
358 (1980)

(w/POWELL)

(states); Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 633

("[T]he status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects."); Colautti, 439 U.S., at 386 n.7 ("State may withhold
funding to indigent women even though such withholding influences
the abortion decision prior to viability."); Maher, 432 u.s., 471477, and in cases examining the privacy rights of minors, see
Matheson, 450 U.S., at 411 ("significant" state interest); id., at
413 (applying rationality test); Carey, 431 U.S., at 693 n.l5 (plurality opinion)

(Danforth "test is apparently less

'compelling state interest' test applied

~ ous

to~estrictions

than the

on the pri-

vacy rights of adults."); Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 147-148; Danforth, 428 U.S., at 74-75 ("[T]he State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.").
F.

-

Harmonizing the Cases.
~

If the Court is inclined to contin-

ue its present structure of analysis, it should first reject the
SG's position that "unduly burdens" signals the need for a compelling state interest.

Although the opinions are not entirely consisL.,(

...,

tent, it is fair to say that "unduly burdensome" is a conclusion ! or
a..

those regualtions that cannot be justified even by a compelling
,--

"'

state interest.

..

-...~.

v

....._.,,.....,~

~

See Harris, 448 U.S., at 314; id., at 328 (WHITE,

~

J., concurring)

(Roe operates to free a woman from "unreasonable

official interference with private choice"); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. ~
640 (POWELL, J.)

(the question before the Court is whether a

Mass.~

statute "provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that
does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion"); Beal, 432
U.S., at 446 (interest does not "become sufficiently compelling to
justify unduly burdensome state interference).

See also Carey, 431

29.
U.S., at 689 (ban on sale of contraceptives imposed "a significant
burden on the right of the individuals to use contraceptives"); id.,
at 686 ("[R]egulations imposing a burdne on [abortion decision] may
be justified only by compelling state interests"); Bellotti I, 428
U.S., at 147.
(1965)
268

v

See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

u.s.

479, 485

("maximum destructive impact"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,

u.s.

510, 534-535 (1925)

....

("unreasonably interferes").

Carey, 431 U.S., at 705 (POWELL, J., concurring)

But see

(Compelling-state-

interest standard "has been invoked only when the state regulation
entirely frustrates or heavily burdens the exercise of constitutional rights in this area.").

At the same time, the Court should state

expressly that it is inaccurate to say that there can be no burden
without a compelling state interest.

Any regulation imposes at

least some limits on the abortion decision.

More accurately, the

permissible burden should be described as de minimus.

Anything

greater requires a showing that it furthers a compelling state interest.
The funding and minor cases also can be considered within this
traditional framework.
with in two ways.

The parental consent cases could be dealt

First, although the Court has stated that there

are no compelling state interests in the 1st trimester, Menillo, 423

u.s.,

at 10-11 (underscoring that 1st-trimester regulations that

"restrict" abortion are permissible only if they insure the existence of the medical standards that underlie the finding in Roe of
the safety of 1st-trimester abortions); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at
195, the Court has treated the states' interest in protecting minors
as if it were a compelling state interest, cf. New York v. Ferber,

~
102 s.ct. 3348, 3354 (1982)

~:::tt

("It is evident beyond the need

elaboration that a state's interest in 'safeguarding the

physical~'

and psychological well being of a minor' is 'compelling."')

~be

Newspapers v. Superior

for ~~
(quoting

our , 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2621 (1982)).

Second, the Court might say that minors have no right to "decide" to
have an abortion unless they can truly exercise that right.

To the

extent that the Court's decisions can be read as permitting states
to regulate the abortions of minors to assure that they are mature
enough to consent, see Danforth, 428 u.s., at 75, it may be fair to
say that immature minors, by definition, have no Roe right.

The

public funding decisions can be characterized as simply involving
the "state encouragement of an alternative activity" and not a "direct state interference with a protected activity."
u.s., at 475.
G.

Maher, 432

See Harris, 448 u.s., at 314.

New Approaches.

The SG persuasively argues that whether or

not a particular legislative enactment "unduly burdens" the abortion
choice depends upon the resolution of competing public policy issues
upon which reasonable people readily disagree.

Because legislatures

have superior factfinding capabilites, are directly responsible to
the public for their resolution of the policy issues they treat, and
have greater flexibility than the courts to fine-tune and redirect
their efforts if a particular solution is ill-founded or unwise, the
courts should test the constitutionality of legislation impacting
upon the abortion choice by an appropriately deferential standard.
The difficulty with this approach is that it is basically an argument that the Court should not have found the right to an abortion
to be a fundamental right in the first instance.

Unless the Court
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wishes to overturn Roe v. Wade, it should adopt an analysis more
consistent with its fundamental rights doctrine.
The position of the CA6 and of the law professors is much more
principled than the current test.

Anything more deferential to the

state legislatures will encourage sundry state regulations-ostensibly to protect some state interest, but ultimately to discourage exercise of the fundamental right--to be litigated one-byone before this Court.

Not only does such an analysis encourage

increased litigation, and multiply the difficulty and improbability
of unprincipled decisionmaking, it also undermines the integrity of
the Court by increasing the number of situations in which it calls
the majoritarian preferences of a state or states into question.
The escape valve for the two-tier test might be for the Court
to state expressly that there may be compelling state interests in
the first trimester and that there may be more than the two identified in Roe.

Such an analysis gets the Court into a more explicit

balancing of the interests (and invites states to litigate more of
them), but it has the virtue of not hiding the Court's analysis behind the "burden"/"unduly burdensome" labels.

It would also be more

consistent with fundamental rights analysis in other areas of the
law.
III.
A.

Twenty-one states have, according to amici curiae, acted to
require hospitalization for second trimester abortions.
1.

Definition of Hospital.

It is important to understand the

requirements for "hospital" in each state.
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a.

Va.

Va. requires only that second-trimester abortions be

"performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of
Health."

Va. Code §18.2-73.

Elsewhere in the the Va. Code, the

state defines "hospital" to include "outpatient" hospitals.
~

Code §32.1-123.1.

Va.

The Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of

OutPatient Surgical Hospitals, Part I, §20.2.11 defines "outpatient
hospital" to include "o4 atient abortion clinics."

Part II require

that outpatient facilities develop written policies and procedures
with respect to the operative procedures to be performed, §41.2.1,
the anesthesia to be available, §41.2.1, the patient consent forms
to be used, §41.2.4, and infection control, §41.2.5.

.,7

·

The Rules re-

quire that only physicians perform surgical procedures, §42.1.2, and
that at

least ~e

registered nurse be available at all times that

the facility is in use, §42.2.3.
preparations be made for

~ergency

The Rules further require that
services.

Monitoring, suction,

and resuscitation equipment must also be available, as well as means
to control hemorrhage.
tain technologica

§43.5.1.

In sum, Va. law requires that cer-

support and safety mechanisms be available if a

woman is undergoing a second-trimester abortion.
The State Board of Health Regulations for certification of outpatient hospitals also require that patients undergoing surgical
procedures in outpatient hospitals be observed by trained personnel
for a minimum of sixty minutes to guard against post-operative complications.

§43.9.2.

P.M. left the Simopoulos's clinic in five

minutes.
-.../'

b.

Akron Ordinance.

As defined by §1870.0l(B), "hospital"

~

means "a general hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology

r
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or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, or by the American Osteopathic Association."

c.

~ ~·

seperately

Mo. apparently does not define "hospitals"

or abortion purposes, but defines "abortion facility" as

"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in
which abortions are performed other than a hospital."
2.

Prior Court Statements.

In the 2d trimester, the state has

a compelling interest in seeing to it that "abortion, like any other
medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient.

This interest obviously extends at

least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities
involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise."
U.S., at 150.

Roe, 410

The Roe Court found that, even though the state's

interest in protecting the woman from an "inherently hazardous procedure" has effectively disappeared, important state interests in
health and medical standards remain.

410

u.s.,

at 149.

In Bolton,

410 U.S., at 194-195, the Court affirmed the principle that a state
may, "from and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards
for licensing all facilities where abortions may be performed so
long as those standards are legitimately related to the objective
the State seeks to accomplish."

The hospitalization requirement is

designed to insure the abortion procedures used are "performed by
medically competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum
safety for the woman."

v

See Menillo, 423

u.s.,

at 11.

It is certainly arguable that the Court has already held that
second-trimester hospitalization is an acceptable "regulation r ea-

34.
sonably related to the perservation and protection of maternal
health."

Roe, 410

u.s.,

at 163.

In Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's

Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 902 (NDind. 1980)

("A

statutory regulation of second trimester abortions is constitutional
if it was reasonable for the state to conclude that the regulations
would promote maternal health."), aff'd, 451

u.s.

934 (1981); see

Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services, Inc. v. Bowen, 421 F. Supp.
734 (N.D. Ind. 1976)

(denying injunctive relief from an Indiana

statute requiring that a second trimester abortion be performed in a
hospital), aff'd, 429 U.S. 1067 (1977), the DC rejected a challenge
to a hospitalization requirement as applied to the D&E procedure.
The DC relied on the Roe language that hospitalization during the
second trimester is permissible and on its findings that the requirement furthered maternal health.

See 496 F. Supp., at 898-902.

At the same time, however, the DC stated that, even if the pltfs
prevailed on their legal theory that a safer abortion could require
alteration of Roe, they would still lose, because they had presented
insufficient proof of safety to justify a preliminary injunction.
See id., at 902-903.

Another possible distinction is that the Indi-

ana statute in Gary-Northwest defines "hospital" to include ambulatory outpatient centers.
3.

Burden.

There is a substantial argument, relying on Har-

ris, that there is no legally significant burden by any hospitalization requirement: the state has not created any of the "obstacles to
abortion"

(here, the inconvenience of location, parental consent)

that are associated with the hospital requirement.

Here, however,

the regulation itself contributes substantially to any burden that
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the pregnant woman eventually must bear.

In Danforth, Mo. had

banned saline abortion procedures, and alternatives were less cornrnonly used.

Here all nonhospital 2d-trirnester procedures are

banned; alternatives are much more expensive.

It would seem that

the "burdens" imposed differ only in degree.
The Court should acknowledge that

the~=
1\

burden on the decision to have an abortion.

some

The specific burdens

are:
a.

------

Availability.

It is clear that, in the many areas where

hospitals are inaccessible to physicians providing abortions, the
effect of the hospitalization requirement may be to force the woman
to endure an unwanted pregnancy: 78% of the counties and 59 Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas had no facilities, of any kind, in
which legal abortions were performed in 1980.

Only 21% of all hos-

pitals in the U.S. perform abortions after the 1st trimester, and
indeed, only 24% of all abortion providers perform abortions after
14 weeks.

Only 2 of 16 or 17 hospitals (12%} in northern Virginia

perform 2d-trirnester abortions on adults (0% for women under age 18
without parental consent}; state-wide, only 24 out of 95

provide~

abortion service.
b.

---

Increased Costs. The CA in Akron and the DC in Ashcroft
._,.....,.,....
found in-patient abortions to be at least twice the cost of the same

--

_____________.

procedure performed in an outpatient clinic, with the additional
expense of having a second trimester abortion performed in a hospital as compared to a clinic ranging from $150 to $1,650.

The travel

frequently required to comply with hospitalization requirements and
mandatory waiting periods imposes an additional significant burden
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on the abortion decision, as do the expenses incurred for transportation, lodging, and child care, as well as the loss of income because of the additional time required.

In Va.

These economic im-

pediments to end a pregnancy by abortion are particularly important
in light of the federal and state restrictions on the public funding
of abortions.
c.

--------

Less Privacy.

In-hospital requirements inevitably intrude

on the "privacy" of any abortion decision.

By increasing the costs,

time, and travel for abortions, more people, particularly relatives,
will know, and perhaps interfere with the woman's decision.
d.

Conclusion.

The burdens must be justified by their promo-

tion of some compelling state interest.
2.

Compelling State Interest.

If it is true that there is

some legally significant burden on the abortion decision, "the State
must show •.• that only the full resources of a licensed hospital,
rather than those of some other appropriately licensed institution,
satisfy [its] health interests."
a.

Risk to Health.

Bolton, 410 U.S., at 195.

No one has pointed to a law in any other

medical situation restricting the right of a competent adult to deermine, in consultation with their physicians, whether the medical
treatment requires hospitalization.
r (

\.\

Va. has, of course, no criminal

-----

---

law re uiring childbirth or any other procedure to take place in a
hospital, and many medical-surgical procedures have a greater risk
of mortality than do abortions.

See Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 78

(abortion safer throughout pregnancy); Roe, 410 U.S., at 149.
Second-trimester D&E abortions have a 7.7/100,000 mortality rate,
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while childbirth has a 9.9/100,000 rate.

An appendectomy is report-

ed to have a mortality rate of 230/100,000 procedures.
On the other hand, a 2d-trimester abortion is 4.6 to 35 times
more dangerous than a first-trimester abortion.
complications.

There are various

Between 1972 and 1978, 79 women undergoing 2d-

trimester abortions in this country died as a result of the abortion
procedure.
b. Safety of Non-Hospital Abortions.

The evidence does not

support a conclusion that second-trimester hospital abortions are
significantly less dangerous to a woman's health than comparable
procedures performed in nonhospital clinics.

It can be said with

early in the second trimester {13-15 weeks) in clinics.

For other

procedures, however, such as saline and prostaglandins {which accounts for about 50% of the abortions), the risks increase, and

--

~

for D&E, procedures after 15 or 16 _weeks are as dangerous to the
~-----~

health of pregnant women as are other procedures.

It is particular-

ly significant that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, reversing an earlier position, has concluded:
Generally, abortions in the physician's office or outpatient clinic should be limited to 14 weeks from the
first day of the last menstrual period.
In a hospitalbased or in a free-standing ambulatory surgical facility,
or in an out-patient clinic meeting the criteria required
for a free-standing surgical facility, abortions should be
limited to 18 weeks from the last menstrual period.
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric Gynecologic Services 54{1982).

The

American Public Health Association advises that "[r]equirements that
all abortions after [the first trimester] be performed in hospitals

I

I -

.

~

•

•
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increase the expense and inconvenience to the woman without contributing to the safety of the procedure."
3.

Conclusior.

----

The clinics argue that here, as in Bolton, 410

U.S., at 195: "The State ••• has not presented persuasive data to show
that only hospitals meet its acknowledged interest in insuring the
quality of the operation and the full protection of the patient."
The issue boils down, however, to whether constitutionality of the
hospitalization requirements will depend upon the facts of each

cas~
/

J=-..rwv-

(the availiability of hospitals in the area that perform second trimester abortions; what is a "hospital") and the apparently increasing safety of abortion techniques.

Danforth is precedent for con-

stitutional recognition of medical progress: saline amniocentesis
was widely accepted in the medical community, abortions by other
methods were not so widely available in Mo., and the prohibition
increased risks to the women it was supposed to protect.

In this

case, D&E abortions are increasingly becoming the procedure of
choice for the early weeks of the second of the second trimester,

---------- --

and abortions can be safely performed in at least some nonhospital
facilities up until the 18th week.
It is probably preferable, however, that, at this time, the
court continue to adhere to its "bright-line" rule approving
talization requirements.

--

-

-

~ospi-

There is some risk in the latter half of

------'"
~
the second-trimester
that justifies a hospitalization requirement at
that point, and because this Court has consistently used "trimesters" as the legally significant timetable of pregnancies, it cannot
be said that the requirement is not "reasonably related" to the pro-
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motion of maternal health in the second trimester.

Judge Sharp's

opinion in Gary-Northwest is persuasive:
To ••• hold [the] hospitalization requirement unconstitutional because of its impact on nontherapeutic early second trimester D&E abortions would ultimately require that
the second trimester be split for purposes of determining
the constitutionality of regulations. Such a holding
would require states to adopt, for their maternal health
regulations, some cutoff other than the end of the first
trimester.
Interpreting Roe to require that second trimester regulations except specific types of abortions which may be safer than childbirth would require re-litigation of the regulation's constitutionality with each change in the availability of abortions, with each improvement in abortion
technique, and with each publication of statistics showing
that abortion skills have improved.
496 F. Supp., at 899, 901-902.
On the other hand, the Court might wish to apply a strict twotier analysis, create new compelling state interests, and discard
the dated "trimester" scheme.

The test would be that the state's

hospitalization requirement must further a compelling state interest, regardless of the trimester.

The interest in maternal health

is greater as the weeks pass, but the test would not change.

More

important, the Court could make clear that "reasonably related" is
not a sufficient fit: the regulation must be closely tailored to
further the compelling state interest.

Under such a scheme, Va.'s

use of clinics, with some minor regulations, is permissible, while
Mo.'s definition of "hospital" is unduly burdensome.

The Court's

"hospital requirement" law could track the A.C.O.G. requirements,
yet remain flexible enough to incorporate changes in medical procedure, without changing the substantive standards.
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B.

Information Requirements.
1.

Prior Statements.

The Court in Danforth noted that "it is

desirable and imperative that [the abortion decision] be made with
full knowledge of its nature and consequences."

428 U.S., at 67.

The Court described "informed consent" as "the giving of information
to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences."

Id., at 67 n.8.

The Court cautioned that" [t]o ascribe

more meaning than this might well confine the attending physician in
an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his
profession."

Id.

Nevertheless, in Matheson the Court approved in a

footnote an informational requirement that the patient be told
"about available adoption services, about fetal development, and
about foreseeable complications and risks of an abortion."
U.S., at 400 n.l.

450

See Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpat-

rick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 588 (EDPa. 1975}

(approving an informed con-

sent provision; "[p]roper counseling ... could incorporate the information demanded by advice to the individual case"}, aff'd, Franklin

v. Fitzpatrick, 428

u.s.

901 (1976}.

2.

Burden on Decision.

a.

Menstrual Abortions.

Section 1870.06(B} (1} and (2) require

that the patient be told "to the best judgment of her attending physician" that she is pregnant and the number of weeks that have
elapsed from the "probable" time of conception.

Accurate is not

always possible, but the requirement will not preclude doctors from
performing menstrual extractions.
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b.

Confusion.

Some of the information (such as on viability)

is likely to be irrelevant in the first or second trimester, when
most abortions are performed, and thus confusing.
c.

Incorrect Information.

Some of the information required by

§1870.06(C) may be simply false.

In Ashcroft, physicians' testimony

indicated that they do not believe that there are long-term physical
and psychological effects of abortion.

Medical testimony has char-

acterized the possibility of "organic pain" to fetus as "medically
meaningless, confusing,

[and] medically unjustified."

Medical ex-

perts apparently dispute that abortions increase the risks of sterility, premature births, tubal pregnancies, and still births in
future pregnancies.
d.

Emotional Distress.

Fetal descriptions and information on

medical complications would cause many women emotional distress,
anxiety, guilt or physical pain that might influence the patient's
decision, even where the doctor might think that the abortion is in
his patient's best medical interests.

Most doctors would probably

not consider upsetting their patients before an abortion a good medical practice.

The required informaThe Akron ordinance makes no

exception, requiring the information to be given to all women, and
thus the doctor's "counseling" could undo counseling received before
the patient asked for an abortion.

Testimony in the Akron trial

indicated that 65%-75% of the patients had seen professional counselors before going to the clinics.
e.

Public Assistance Programs.

Subsections (6) and (7) would

require the doctor to acquire some expertise not normally within his
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medical background.

This may have some costs, but it is certainly

de minimis.
f.

Risks.

§1870.06(c) precludes operation of "therapeutic

privilege," which recognizes that in some cases, a physician need
not disclose all information, either because the woman requests not
to be told, or because he deems it to be in her best interests.
g.

Increased Costs.

The information requirement forces the

physician to provide the information even though, in his or her professional judgment, a trained counselor would be much more effective
in imparting certain information.

A law denying the physician's

normal authority to delegate educational and communication tasks to
others almost certainly increases the costs of the abortion and reduces the number of abortions performed.

Finally, informed consent

has generally been achieved by private agreement and the tort law,
and criminal provisions here for doctors may discourage some doctors
from performing abortions.

It is true that the possibility of crim-

inal sanctions will probably have little impact on doctors at abortion clinics, but it may exacerbate the shortage, and in many areas
total unavailability, of physicians and hospitals willing to perform
the abortions.
h.

Conclusion.

It is difficult to say that the information

requirments impose no burden on the abortion decision, but the requirements as to information on pregnancy, stage, welfare benefits,
fetal development, and risk may be legally insignificant.

The other

informational requirements probably require scrutiny of the alleged
compelling state interests they purport to further.
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3.

Compelling State Interests.

a.

Consultation.

If anything, the information requirements

promote the patient-doctor consultation that was found so in need of
protection in Roe, 410 U.S., at 153, 163-165.

The core of the con-

stitutional protection recognized in Roe is best understood, however, as protecting the primacy of the relationship between the woman
and the physician.

See, e. g., Bellotti II, 443

u.s.,

at 641 n.21,

643; Coloutti v. Franklin, 439 U.S., at 387 ("Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in counseling with the
woman ..• and in determining how any abortion was to be carried
out."); Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 61; Roe, 410 U.S., at 163, 164.

It

is unlikely that the state can impose too many inflexible information requirements without infringing on the parties' freedom to consult without interference from the state.

Moreover, it is difficult

to say that states have a "compelling" state interest in requiring
doctors personally to tell their patients all the information listed
in the ordinance.
b.

Informed Consent.

This requirement is designed to protect

the woman and ensure that her consent will be truly informed.

It

certainly furthers a valid state interest in assuring that the consent will be informed.

The state argues that the provision strikes

a reasonable balance between the woman's right of privacy, the
state's interest in maternal health, and everyone's interest in ensuring the informed consent of the patient.
473.

See Maher, 432 U.S., at

It is not clear, however, that the state's interest is compel-

ling or that the information must be given by a doctor.
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c.

Conclusion.

§§1870.06 (B) (3), (4) & (5) are probably uncon-

stitutional, but .06(B)

(1),

(2),

(6) & (7) should be saved.

In-

deed, the information in (6) and (7) is currently provided to patients at resp clinics, and probably the giving the other information is also routine.

The A.C.O.G. recommends that "[a] clinic

should provide 'specialized' counselling which 'explores the options
for the management of an unwanted pregnancy [and] examines the
risks •... "
The question is whether the valid sections, standing alone,
would "create a program quite different from the one the legislature
actually adopted."

Sloan v. Lemon, 413

also Champlin, 286 U.S., at 234.

u.s.

825, 834 (1973).

See

The DC and CA's refusal to rewrite

§1870.06(B) by severing some subsections is too rigid.
C.

Waiting Period.

1.

Burden.

The city concedes that the mandatory waiting peri-

od imposes a "restriction" on a woman's "access to an abortion."
The waiting period requires that the patient make two trips to the
clinic instead of one, with the attendant increases in time loss,
inconvenience, travel, child care, work-loss expenses, and probably
medical costs.

Apparently many facilities provide abortion services

only once or twice a week, and thus a 24-hour waiting period may
actually mean a minimum delay of two to four days.

Even a delay of

two to seven days can pose a significant health risk to women undergoing abortions: expert testimony presented to the DC in Akron indicated that generally every week of delay beyond eight weeks' gestation increases the risk of morbidity by 20% and of mortality by 50%.
Moreover, pregnancy poses health risks that an abortion avoids.
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Although a waiting period creates some health risks, it is not
clear how significant this risk is.

Several medical experts stated

at trial that the waiting period would not create a significant risk
and that such a delay is even desirable in terms of time to reflect.
2.

"Compelling" State Interest.

any compelling state interest here.

It is very difficult to find
The burden cannot be justified

in the 1st trimester, and it is not "reasonably related" to the
state's interest in promoting health.

The A.C.O.G. recommends that

the clinics should "allo[w] sufficient time for reflection prior to
making an informed decision," but 24-hours seems to be "unduly burdensome" and, under the suggested analysis, "not narrowly tailored."
D.

Pathology Reports.

1.

Burden.

The only burden this requirement imposes is some

additional expense.
$40.

The DC found the costs to range from $10 to

It would apply in the 1st trimester.
This burden seems legally insignificant.
2.

Compelling State Interests.

If the "burden" must be justi-

fied as promoting some compelling state interest, it probably can be
shown in the 2d or 3d trimester.

The reports are primarily useful

in indicating serious, possibly fatal disorders.
ever, make several objections.

The clinics, how-

First, the state does not require by

statute pathology reports in other kinds of surgical procedures.
The state argues, however, that it is justified in singling out
abortions for two reasons.

First, it is the one surgical procedure

commonly performed outside of hospitals by clinics that will be unlikely to complicate their procedures or refer cases to pathology
absent state regulation.

Abortion clinics are not routinely moni-
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tored by government agencies, nor are their surgical employees evaluated by medical records committees, peer groups or JCAH review.
Second, abortions involve the reproductive capabilities of the patient, and the pathology requirement will ensure the detection of
ectopic pregnancies and provide an opportunity to discover the
presentee of molar pregnancy, a hydatritaforme mole, or other precancerous growths.

Recorded pathology reports, in concert with

abortion complication reports, should provide a statistical basis on
which to study those complications.
The statute does not specify whether a "gross" examination or a
microscopic examination is necessary.

The clinics argue that this

choice should be left to the physician, who can perform a gross as
well as a pathologist.

This seems, however, to minimize the exper-

tise of a pathologist, and the state should be free to give him special weight.
3.

Conclusion.

Not all distinctions between abortions and

other procedures are invalid.

See Bellotti, 428 U.S., at 147.

This

requirement may fall within the "insignificant burden" category of
state regulation not requiring the justification of a compelling
state interest.

In any case, the statute is reasonably related to a

legitimate state interest in maintaining the standard of medical
care provided abortion patients, and at least should be constitutional as applied in the 2d and 3d trimesters.
E.

The second attending physician requirement.

1.

Prior Court Statements.

This Court has recognized the "im-

portant and legitimate interest [of the state] in protecting the
potentiality of human life."

Roe v. Doe, 432 U.S., at 162.

See
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Beal v. Doe, 432

u.s.

438, 445-446 (1977).

The Court in Roe stated

that, if the state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortions during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother.
2.

Burden.

The burden that this requirement imposes on the

abortion decision is the increased cost of a second physician during
the abortion.

u.s.,

This burden is significant.

at 198-200.

See Doe v. Bolton, 410

The techniques of terminating a viable pregnancy

late in term often require over many hours or even days.
3.

Compelling State Interest.

The purpose of a second doctor

is to provide for an immediate presence during the abortion and for
immediate medical care for the child when born.
Mo. has proscribed post-viability abortions except when necessary to preserve the health or lives of pregnant women.
Rev. Stat. §188.030.1.

See Mo.

The state also requires that the physician

performing an abortion choose the procedure most likely to preserve
the life and health of the infant, except when such procedure poses
a greater risk to the mother than some other available method.
§188.030.2.

Id.,

The state contends that the number of situations per-

mitting an abortion after viability and justifying D&E are rare;
that D&E is not the procedure of safety after 24 weeks of pregnancy;
that a second physician will require a procedure of safety for the
infant; and that after 15 weeks, the risk of D&E to the mother's
health is about the same as for other procedures.
4.

Conclusion.

The CA8 found that the requirement was

overbroad in that a fetus cannot survive a D&E procedure after via-
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bility: the fetus is sufficiently large that it must be dismembered
and the skull crushed in order to evacuate the uterus.

But D&E is

not a favored means of terminating a pregnancy after viability.

If

indeed the second doctor is for the protection of the fetus, the
second physician may discourage use of the D&E procedure.

More

likely, the second doctor will not function as an advocate for the
fetus.

Nevertheless, Roe seems to permit "unduly" burdens in the

third trimester.

The CAS's decision on this requirement should be

reversed.
F.

Restrictions for minors.

1.

Posture of Akron Case.

{1) Preservation of issue.

Review of the CA6's invalidation of

the first regulation is impeded by the fact that Akron did not appeal that issue from the DC, while the petn of the intervenors--who
did appeal this issue to the CA6--was not granted by the Court.

The

question is whether an issue that was argued and decided in the CA
can be raised in this Court by a party that did not participate in
this phase of the argument.

See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Cen-

ter, 447 U.S. 773, 783 n.l4 {1980).
In O'Bannon, the Court was faced with a similar question:
whether a deft who acquiesces in an adverse ruling at the DC level,
which its co-deft appeals to the CA, can then raise the issue in
this Court.

This Court held that deft's waiver of that issue in the

CA precluded Court review, even though its co-deft, who did not petn
for cert, raised the question below.

See 447

u.s.,

at 783 n.l4.

See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 41 n.2 {1976); Adickes v.
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S.H. Kress & Co., 398

u.s.

144, 146 n.2 (1970); California v. Tay-

lor, 353 U.S. 553, 556 n.2 (1957).
(2) Standing.

Unless and until the section is challenged by a

minor who contends that she is mature, a holding that the section is
unconstitutional would be improper.

In Matheson, 450 U.S., at 405-

406 (parental notification), the Court refused to consider pltf's
overbreadth argument: "We need not reach that question since she did
not allege or proffer any evidence that either she or any member of
her class is mature or emancipated."

See id., at 407 (declining "to

pass on constitutional challenges to an abortion regulation statute
because the statute was 'susceptible of a construction by the state
judiciary which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for
federal constitutional adjudication"); Bellotti I, 432

u.s.,

at 147.

The intervenors demonstrated no art. III standing necessary for
appellate resolution.

They did not allege their daughters were sex-

ually active, likely to become pregnant, or likely to seek an abortion.

None of the intervenors were then pregnant.

U.S., at 127-129.

See Roe, 410

The speculative chain of events that must be en-

visioned here cannot satisfy the minimum art. III requirement that
the litigant show "an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Rights Organization, 426

u.s.

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare

26, 38 (1976).

In addition, by the

time of the CA6 appeal, both daughters were over age 15 and could
not be affected by §1870.05(B).
192; Roe, 410
2.

u.s.,

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S., at

at 127-129.

Past Court Comments.

In 1974, Mo. sought to require paren-

tal consent for all unmarried minors under the age of 18.

In Dan-

50.
forth, the Court stated that Mo. could not "give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."

428

u.s.,

at 75.

In Bellotti II, the Court found the Mass. statute defective in two
respects:

(1) "it permits judicial authorization for an abortion to

be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior court to be
mature and fully competent to make this decision independently"; and
(2)

"it requires parental consultation or notification in every in-

stance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature
enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interests.

The Court made clear that a state may not, in the abortion

context, enact a statute that precludes "the opportunity for case by
case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors."

Bellotti II,

443 U.S., at 643 n.23.
In Matheson, JUSTICE POWELL stated that "a State may not validly require notice to parents in all cases, without providing an independent decisionmmaker to when a pregnant minor can have recourse
if she believes that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision independently or that notification otherwise would not be in
her best interests."
Bellotti, 443

u.s.,

450

u.s.,

at 420 (concurring opinion).

See

at 642-648.

Nevertheless, a majority of the Justices of this Court would
approve a more narrowly drafted statute allowing minors, judicially
determined to be mature, to make their own abortion decisions while
requiring immature minors to obtain a consent-substitute, parental
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permission or judicial authorization predicated upon a determination
of the minor's best interests.

See Bellotti, 443

(plurality opinion for four Justices)
(WHITE, J., dissenting)

u.s.,

at 643-644

(POWELL, J.); id., at 656-657

(expressing approval of even absolute paren-

tal consent requirement).

See Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 650-651

(" [A]ll members of [this] Court agreed that providing for decisionmaking authority in a judge was not the kind of veto power held
invalid in Danforth.").

In Matheson, 450

u.s.,

at 411 (applying

rationality standard), this Court upheld a parental notification
requirement because it served not only "the important considerations
of family integrity and protecting adolescents" but also "a significant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a physician."

This

Court did not, however, extend that holding to mature or emancipated
minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental
to their best interests.

See id., at 407 & n.l4.

In sum, a parental/judicial consent provision depends on whether its judicial authorization alternative satisfies two criteria:
(1) the judicial inquiry must not withhold an abortion from a minor
found mature and fully competent to make this decision independently; and (2) the judicial inquiry must not require parental notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she
is mature enought to consent or that an abortion would be in here
best interest.

See Matheson, 450

u.s.,

at 411 (POWELL, J.); id., at

1186-1194 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, with BRENNAN & BLACKMON, JJ.);
Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 651 (plurality opinion).

.

-
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3.

Akron Ordinance.

The Akron ordinance does not specify that

judicial inquiry is to be limited in the manner suggested above.

It

is possible that a state court could save the statute by imposing
such a construction on its language.

Although the city suggests

that the juvenile court would have jurisdiction over the minor, the
only circumstance in which the juvenile court can authorize nonemergency medical treatment is upon a finding of parental neglect.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2151.23.

See

Neglected child is defined as one

"[w]hose parents •.. neglects or refuses to provide him with proper or
necessary .•. medical or surgical care, or other care necessary for
his health, morals or well being."

The statute is relatively silent

on what happens to those minors whose best interests require that
one or both parents not be informed, or to those minors who are mature.

Akron's most powerful argument is that the state should be

free to adopt a per se rule that no one under 15 years of age may
consent to an abortion becuase it is very unlikely that anyone that
age is mature enough to consent.

Despite the force of this conten-

tion, the Court in Bellotti II made clear that a case-by-case inquiry is crucial to a determination regarding a pregnant minor's ability to decide.

443 U.S., at 643-644 & n.23.

Ohio law provides a mandatory procedure to be followed in juvenile proceedings.

The procedures were not constitutionally chal-

lenged, on their face or as applied.

Neither the DC nor the CA6

engaged in a detailed construction of this provision before invalidating it.

Although the Court has expressed its desire that federal

courts defer to state courts when so requested under such circumstances, see Bellotti I, 428 U.S., at 146-151, it does not appear

•

•
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that the city ever requested that the federal courts below abstain
or certify the construction issue to the state courts.
134 (appts moved for abstention} .

Cf. id., at

It would seen that a requirement

of parental or judicial consent for abortions for all minors under
the age of 15 would be unconstitutional.

The Akron provision chal-

lenged here--enacted before this Court's decision in Bellotti-apparently allows parents or, alternatively, a court, to veto the
abortion choice of even a minor under the age of 15 years who is
sufficiently mature to reach that decision herself: the provision,
as it is written, contains no procedural safeguards that ensure an
abortion for an immature minor under the age of 15 years whose best
interests require termination of her pregnancy without any parental
involvement.

See id., at 651.

See also Matheson, 450 U.S., at 413-

20 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.}

(some minors'

best interests require exemption from parental notification}; id.,
at 446, 452-53 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN & BLACKMON, JJ.}

(same}.

Where, as here, the class addressed consists of

pregnant minors below the age of 15, the procedures purportedly offering a meaningful alternative to parental involvement should be
clearly described and easily understood.

This provision, referring

only to "a court having jurisdiction," fails this test.
4.

Mo. Statute.

§188.028(4} is another pre-Bellotti II provision, and, indeed,
is very similar to the one challenged there.

It has several faults.

First, the challenged statute does not except married women under
the age of 18 who may not be "emancipated."

It also permits the

court to deny the minor's petn, even though she may be capable of
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giving her own consent.

The permissible orders by the court under

§188.028(4) in subsections (a) through (c) are all independent alternatives, joined by the disjunctive "or."

Moreover, it mandates

parental involvement at all stages and in all cases, regardless of
the minor's best interests.
1BB.02B(l)' (2)'

See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.028.1(1):

(5) & (6).

The clinics' challenges, however, ignore the CAB's holding,
striking down Mo.'s requirement that the juvenile court notify the
minor's parents in every case:

No notice to parents need be given

when consent has been provided by a court.

Moreover, as interpreted

by the CAB, the statute requires the juvenile court to allow a mature minor to give consent herself.

The CAB's construction of the

statute, although somewhat strained as a matter of statutory interpretation, conforms to the requirements of Danforth and Bellotti II.
There is one troubling feature of the provision, even as construed.

In Bellotti II, the Court indicated that the alternative

judicial bypass "must assure that the resolution of the issue will
be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition."

The CAB

construed the statute to provide anonymity, because the minor's name
is not disclosed.

It is more difficult, however, to conclude that

the challenged provisions "assure" a prompt determination at either
trial court level, §lBB.02B.2[4], or at the appellate level,
§lBB.02B.2[4].

In fact, regarding appeals, the matter of expedition

is left to the adoption of state rules, that have not been adopted.
The Court could, however, track the CAB's conclusion and avoid the
issue by stating that "we are confident the Missouri Supreme Court

I
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will exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that recognizes the serious dangers caused by delay.
F.

Disposal in Humane Manner.

a.

Fitzpatrick.

Section 1870.16 deals with the disposal of

the remains in a humane and sanitary manner.

The overall intent of

the section is, as was noted in Planned Parenthood Association v.
Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (EDPa 1975)

(upholding a regula-

tion that provided that the Department of Health make regulations
for the humane disposal of remains), aff'd mem., 428

u.s.

901

(1976) , "to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on garbage piles."

Fitzpatrick occurred in the context of an enabling

statute pursuant to which regulations had not yet been adopted and
which did not purport to engage in a vagueness analysis.

Rather, it

upheld the requirement of a "humane" disposal against a challenge
that the requirement unconstitutionally burdened the woman's right
to an abortion.

The enabling statute provided that "[t]he depart-

ment shall make regulations to provide for the humane disposition of
dead fetuses."

401 F. Supp., at 572.

The DC ruled:

Of course, a regulation that requires expensive burial may
very well invade the privacy of the pregnant woman and
burden her decision concerning an abortion. However, no
such regulation has been adopted to date pursuant to Section 5(c), and we find that this section is not unconstitutional on its face. We, of course, do not foreclose a
future challenge to any unconstitutional regulation adopted pursuant to this sections.
Id., at 573.

See Winters v. New York, 333

u.s.

%07, 515 (1948)

(standard for vagueness are less stringently applied to laws such as
enabling statutes than to criminal statutes).

The only question

presented on appeal to this Court was the constitutionality of the
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. )

"informed consent" provisions of the statute.

See 44 U.S.L. W. 3375

(Dec. 23, 1975).
b.

Akron Ordinance.

This case involves a final statute that

requires promulgation of no further regulations before criminal liability can be imposed.

In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle,

As with the statute stricken in Colautti, §1870.16 forces physicians
to speculate on the meanings of ambiguous language at the risk of
criminal prosecution.
Even if the term "humane" is void for vagueness, sanitary is
less so.

Moreover, the health and safety of the Akron community

would be furthered by providing for the sanitary disposal of the
fetus.

The CA6 perhaps should have severed the "humane" clause and

found the remainder constitutional.

See Champlin Refining Co. v.

Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932), although §1870.19
(severability clause) does not suggest that words within a sentence
can be severed.
III.

Nonabortion Issues

A.

Simopoulos.

1.

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

In a motion to dismiss, appee

contends that this Question II is an untimely cert matter.

This

Court has held, however, that an appant properly before the Court
may include in the questions presented "any other denial of federal
right whether or not capable in itself of being brought here by appeal ..•• "

Flournoy v. Wiener, 321

son v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968)

u.s.

253, 263 (1944).

(p.c.)

See John-

(jurisdiction exercised

to vacate a conviction where "the record is lacking in any evidence
to support the judgment").

See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
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u.s.

469 (1975): Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537 n.2 (1973).

See generally R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 168-172
(CAS 1978) •
Appt contends that the prosecution presented no proof whether a
saline injection caused the fetus' demise and failed to demonstrate
that there was no intervening causes during the two days while the
patient was in the motel.

Medical experts testified that not all

saline injections cause a fetus to be expelled.

When the Va. S.Ct.

observed that there was no proof of another causative factor, it
missed the point: the critical fact is that there was no proof that
the saline injection was the causative factor.
P.M. testified that she took no drugs during her stay in the
motel other than an analgesic that appt had prescribed.

It was un-

disputed that appt had injected saline solution into the amniotic
cavity.

This evidence was sufficient to establish a connection be-

tween the destruction of the fetus and the saline injection.

Appt

notes that his experts testified that saline injections do not always cause a fetus to be expelled, but appt was not indicted for
causing the fetus to be expelled: he was indicted for causing the
fetus to be destroyed.
2.

Burden of Proof.

In Vuitch, this Court held that, when an

exception in incorporated into an enacting clause of a criminal
statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead and prove that
the deft is not within that exception.

402

u.s.,

at 71.

The face

of the Va. statute and the DC provision are not that different.

The

Va. S.Ct. adequately distinguished Vuitch, however, when it construed the Act as not making lack of medical necessity part of the

•

•

.t

..

5B.
criminal offense.

According to this binding construction, medical

necessity is an exception to the abortion offense, set forth in a
section subsequent to the definition of the crime.
New York, 432 u.s. 197 (1977).

See Patterson v.

The va. s.ct. did not hold that the

deft bears the burden of proof: it only held that deft bears the
burden of production.

The Va. S.Ct. clearly held that the prosecu-

tion has the burden of negating the maternal necessity exception
beyond a reasonable doubt once deft "invokes" the defense.
This "saving" constructin, however, creates two related problems.

First, Vuitch expressly stated: "The burden is on the prose-

cution to plead and prove that an abortion was not 'necessary for
the preservation of the mother's life or health.'"
(emphasis added) •

402 u.s., at 71

It is not clear that deft can be made to bear the

burden of production.

More important, the Va. S.Ct.'s construction

makes all abortions indictable and illegal.

Under the Va. s.ct.'s

analysis, an allegation that the abortion was performed in a hospital, during the first trimester of pregnancy, or was necessary for
life or health is relegated to an affirmative defense instead of a
constitutional right.

Thus, the authoritative construction of the

statute conflicts directly with the Roe right.
The Va. S.Ct. alternatively held that the prosecution had met
its burden of proof.

There was evidence introduced that would prob-

ably support a finding of no medical necessity:

(1) the only reason

P.M. gave for seeing Simopoulos was "[t]o have an abortion:
doctor's notes indicated that P.M.'s condition was "normal":

(2) the
(3)

Simopoulos admitted, that at the end of P.M.'s first visit, "[s]he
was calm, composed, relieved, but then to exercise the choice, the
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option of abortion, was entirely up to her and I had no business in
influencing her one way or the other."

Simopoulos' description of

P.M. as far more depressed than the usual patient, and his intimation of concren over possible suicide, is flatly contradicted by
P.M.'s testimony.

She freely admitted being "scared, but nothing

else."
Much of this evidence came out after the state rested.

It is

difficult to see any evidence, submitted by the state, that
Simopoulos intended to perform a non-medically necessary abortion.
Given this apparent lack of presentation--and the total lack of argument on the medical necessity issue in the prosecution's case--as
well as the absence of pertinent findings by the TC, the va. s.ct.'s
decision on this point is probably wrong.
B.

Ashcroft.

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, No. 81-1244, the Court

granted cert to decide whether, under 42 U.S.C. §1988, an award of
attorneys' fees should be proportioned to reflect the extent to
which a pltf has prevailed on the merits of his lawsuit in the DC.
Because the attorney's fees issue here is identical to that in
Hensley, the Court should vacate and remand in light of that case.
IV.

Summary

Because I do not believe that the 5th A creates any substantive
rights, I would recommend overruling Roe.

To the extent, however,

that Roe announces a fundamental substantive due process

right~-

fringements on that right should be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest.

Assuming the Court is not prepared to

back away from its decision in Roe, I recommend reformulation of the
abortion standards along the following lines:

1.

•

60.

The Court should state that there is no "abortion" analy-

1

,~

sis: the sa e strict

compelling state interest/narrowly

tailored) applies to abortion regulation as to state regulation of
other fundamental rights.
2.

The Court should indicate that Roe's "trimester scheme"

reflected the medical knowledge in 1973, but this Court's test remains the same: abortion regulation remains presumptively unconstitutional and states bear the burden of showing that it is narrowly
tailored to further some compelling state interest.

The state has a

duty--and an opportunity--to prove their case, regardless of the
stage of pregnancy.
----~

Of course, the need for regulation in the early

~

weeks will be much less than in the latter weeks, thus permitting
the law to incorporate medical progress without changing the constitutional standard every few years.
3.

The Court should clearly state that there are some compel-

ling state interests in the 1st trimester.

They may be difficult to

narrowly tailor, and may not be furthered certain regulations, but
the Court should abandon the "burden" analysis, which drives the
real inquiry underground.
4.

I would also suggest that the Court consider expanding--

slightly--the number of compelling state interests.

It is more sat-

isfying to consider the state's interest in minors compelling than
it is to view regulations on minors as an exception or as imposing
no "burden."

1

It is no more difficult to say that the state's inter-

est in funding is compelling than it is to say that the lack of
funding imposes no burden.

Finally, some equal protection analysis

would justify regulations for informed consent, recordkeeping, li-

...

•

...
j
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censing, etc. that are required of other medical facilities and procedures.
A.

Simopoulos

1.

The Va. S.Ct.'s construction of its criminal abortion stat-

~~~

ute to not prov1de for lack of necessity as an element of a crime
violates due process.
2.

[Reverse]

There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding

that petr caused the demise of the fetus.
3.

[Affirm]

------

Va.'s mandatory hQEPil alization requirements impose a mini-

mal burden on the woman's decision whether to have an abortion, an ~
they are reasonably related to the state's compelling state interest
in maternal health.

Even if the Court uses my suggested analysis,

it could find that Va.'s licensing requirements do not discrimipate
against abortion clinics and are narrowly tailored to further the
state's interest in ensuring some minimal level of emergency equipment available at those clinics.

[Affirm]

4.

Reverse.

B.

Akron (No. 81-746)

1.

The constitutionality of Akron's parental consent/judicial

authorization provision is not before the Court.

If it is, it is

unconstitutional in the absence of some limiting construction.

Cert

on this issue should be DIGed. [DIG]
2.
i~

The information requirements are a close call.
much of a burden,

compelling

~ ate

~t

in~ st.

much of the

They do not

information~ hers ~

-------

The information on pregnancy, stage of

pregnancy, risks, fetal development, and public assistance, however,
are narrowly tailored (impose little burden) and further, if not a

~\

r . ~-

•
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compelling state interest, at least significant state interests.
Those provisions should be severed and upheld under any analysis.
[Affirm]
3.

Risks.

of the analysis.
sent.

I am inclined to uphold this requirement regardless
It seems an essential component of "informed" con-

[Reverse]
4.

24-Hour Waiting Period.

The burden is significant.

serves no compelling state interest.

It

It is unconstititutional.

[Af-

firm]
5.

"Humane Disposal."

I agree with all the Judges below that

this provision is, under current constitutional doctrine, unconstitutionally vague.

[Affirm]

6.

Affirm in part and reverse in part.

C.

Akron (No. 81-1172)

1.

The Akron ordinance's hospital requirement imposes a real

(cross-appeal)

burden on the decision.

It is, however, reasonably related to the
------s~~
state's compelling state interest in maternal health. ~~~
If the Court used my suggested analysis, it would

f f~

requirement not narrowly tailored, as it precludes inexpensive D&E
abortions in the early weeks of the second trimester without any
corresponding increase in safety.
2.

I think the result depends on the test used.

I recommend

reversal.
D.

Ashcroft (No. 81-1255)

(Mo. Statute)

1.

The Mo. statute, requiring the consent of one parent or of

the juvenile court, is constitutional as construed by the CAS.
firm]

[Af-

•
2.

63.

Affirm.

E.

Ashcroft (No. 81-1623)

1.

The hosptal requirement would be subject to the same analy-

sis as the Akron ordinance.
2.

(cross-petn)

I recommend reversal.

The pathology report requirement imposes an insignificant

burden on the decision and is reasonably related to the state's interest in maternal health.

The CAB's ruling on this provision

should be reversed if the Court uses the burden/trimester test.
Under my suggested analysis, this requirement would probably
not be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.

I

recommend reversal.
3.

The attendance of a second physician during the abortion of

a viable unborn child supports the state's compelling interest in
the third trimester of protecting potential human life.

The CAB's

ruling on this provision should be reversed under current doctrine.
I would uphold it under the suggested analysis, too.
4.

The award of attorney's fees should be vacated and remanded

in light of Hensley v. Echerhart, No. Bl-1244.
5.

Reverse.

(

I •-

•

'
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lfp/ss 12/17/82
81-746 Akron v. Akron Center (Conference 12/16/82
CJ absent due to illness.
This memorandum will summarize the votes on the
three issues before us.
Issue No. 1 - Parental Consent
(i) Standing: Most of the Justices had not focused on the issue. WJB saw no standing problem. I rather
think that there is a standing problem, but the only vote we
took was on the merits.
(ii) Merits of Parental Consent:
CA affirmed the DC decision of invalidity.
We affirmed 5-3 (with some questions)
Voting to affirm were WJB, TM, HAB, and LFP (if
issue is here).
To reverse:

BRW, WHR, SO'C

Issue No. 2 - Parental Notification
The DC invalidated, but CA6 reversed - relying on
Matheson.
In my view, the issue is not here.
on notice and consent).

(See my memo

On merits we affirmed 5-3.
Voting to affirm:
To reverse:

BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS and SO'C

WJB, TM, HAB

Issue No. 3 - Provisions to Assure Consent is "Informed"
CA6 invalidated all provisions, and we affirmed
6-2.

-

.

2.

Voting to affirm:
To reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and SO'C

BRW, WHR

Issue No. 4 - 24 Hour Waiting Period
CA6 held it invalid.
we affirmed 5-3.
Voting to affirm:
To reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS.

BRW, WHR and SO'C

Issue No. 5 - Disposal of Fetal Remains
CA6 held invalid.
We affirmed 6-2.
Voting to affirm:
To reverse:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP, JPS and SO'C

BRW and WHR

* * *
81-1172 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron
The only issue is the requirement for hospitalization in all second trimester cases.
CA6 sustained validity reluctantly, relying on our
summary affirmance of the Indiana statute.
We reversed 5-3.
Voting to reverse:
To affirm:

WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS

BRW, WHR and SO'C

Note: The hospitalization provision in the Akron
ordinance is substantially identical with that in Missouri.
Second trimester abortions may not be performed in clinics,
even the licensed type like those in Virginia.

lfp/ss 12/17/82
MEMO TO FILE
81-746 Akron
There are two sections that tend to be confused:
Section 1870.05(A) requires with respect to women
under 18, the giving of 24 hours prior notice to a parent or
guardian "unless the abortion is ordered by a court having
jurisdiction".

(the "notice provision")

Section 1870.05(B) provides, with respect to minors under 15, that written consent must be obtained both
from the minor and a parent or guardian unless approval has
been obtained from a court having jurisdiction. (the "consent" provision)
The Notice Provision is Not Here
The DC invalidated both the notice and consent
provisions.

The original defendants (the city, etc.) did

not appeal, but intervenors did appeal.

Relying on

Matheson, and particularly on my concurring opinion, CA6
reversed.

Matheson sustained the notice provision because

the minor in that case made no claim either that she was
mature or that her best interests would not be served by
parental notification.
In this case, CA6 noted that the intervenors - the
only appealing parties - are "parents of unmarried minor
daughters".

Neither the maturity nor condition with respect

to emancipation of these minors was shown.

CA6 accordingly

held that the notice provision "is a constitutionally per-

2.

missible regulation insofar as it applies to immature minors
who live with their parents, are dependent upon them and are
not emancipated by marriage or otherwise".

This leaves open

situations where the minor is mature or emancipated or where
"notice would not be in her best interest".
Accordingly, CA6 reversed the DC.
that §1870.05(A) is facially valid.
was taken from this decision.

It thus held

Apparently no appeal

Even the brief on behalf of

the original plaintiffs (the clinics and the physicians)
states in footnote 79, p. 48 (red brief) that §1870.05(A) is
"not before this Court".

Consent Provision May Be Here [§1870.05(B)]
CA6 affirmed the decision of the District Court
invalidating the consent provision.

Again, it was held that

no independent decision-maker was provided because juvenile
courts - even when they have jurisdiction - are required to
notify parents.

CA6 relied on Danforth.

On the merits, I would affirm on the basis of my

...

~

pr1or op1n1ons.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 01/31/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mark and Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memo is confined to Part IV.
The substance of it is fine.

(p. 44).

It seems to me,

however, it requires some restructuring.
The difficulty in this respect commences on page
47 with Akron's defense of the parental consent provision.
It argues that the
alternative

juvenile court provides the necessary

procedure.

This

is stated -

though perhaps

not explicitly enough -on p. 47.
After stating that Akron relies on Matheson, the
draft

first

discusses

pages 49 and 50.
the

flow

of

standing

and

then

abstention

on

What is said is good, but it interrupts

the

discussion

of

the

juvenile

court

alternative - to which the draft returns on p. 51.
I tried to do some tinkering and made a hash out
of page 49.

My suggestions is that the standing point be

relegated to a conclusory footnote.
I

am inclined also to put the abstention point

in a footnote, making it somewhat more conclusory than at

2.

present.

The situation is quite different here where only

a city ordinance is involved.
for

believing

that

the

Ohio

There is no justification
legislature would construe

this ordinance or even its juvenile court statute.
my

recollection

standing,

of

abstention

Matheson
became

is

that

once

relatively

have not, however, read Matheson recently.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

we

Also,

found

unimportant.

no
I

,

•
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mark and Jim

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr .

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memo is confined to Part IV.
The

substance of

it is fine.

(p. 44).

It seems to me,

however, it requires some restructuring~
The difficulty in this respect commences on page
47 with Akron's defense of the parental consent provision.
It argues that the
alternative

juvenile court provides the necessary

procedure.

This

is stated -

though perhaps

not explicitly enough -on p. 47.
After stating that Akron relies on Matheson, the
draft

first

discusses

pages 49 and 50.
the

flow

of

standing

and

then

abstention

on

What is said is good, but it interrupts

the

discussion

of

the

juvenile

court

alternative - to which the draft returns on p. 51.
I tried to do some tinkering and made a hash out
of page 49.

My suggestions is that the standing point be

relegated to a conclusory footnote.
I

•

am inclined also to put the abstention point

in a footnote, making it somewhat more conclusory than at

' .

.
2•

•
present.

The situation is quite different here where only

a city ordinance is involved.
for

believing

that

the

Ohio

There is no justification
legislature

would

construe

this ordinance or even its juvenile court statute.
my

recollection

standing,

of

abstention

Matheson
became

is

that

once

relatively

have not, however, read Matheson recently.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

•

•

we

Also,

found

no

unimportant.

I

{v 1-/
MJl SALLY-POW
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mark and Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memorandum relates only to Part V, p.

53-

70.
You will not be surprised to have me say that
the 78 pages of the draft opinion is too long.

Although

on short paper, the footnotes in particular are voluminous
and single spaced.

My guess is this would print out some

50 pages.
Until
identify

any

I

major

reached

Part

V,

of

the

segment

however,
opinion

I

did

not

that

I

feel

sound

and

confidently should be omitted.
The

analysis

of

Part

V

is

straightforward, but it may be twice as long as it need
be.

As

"sell"

you have heard me
a

say before,

lean opinion than a wordy one.

it

is easier
Moreover,

to
the

bench and the bar justly criticize us for saying too much
both in text and notes.
My recollection is that we have a sold majority
for invalidating all of the provisions addressed in Part V

2.

except §1870.06{C)
OK.

-

p.

64-70.

Pages 53, 54 and 55 are

Much of the remainder of the discussion is excellent,

but I

would like to see how it reads when substantially

condensed.
I

have drafted Rider A, p.

58 as a substitute -

reduce version- for pp. 58-64.

Feel fre to improve it.

L.F.P., Jr.
55

a much

I

••

MJ2 SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 01/31/83

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mark and Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memorandum addresses only Part IV-C -

p.

64-70.
Perhaps

this can be tightened up a bit,

and I

would like for you to give this a try.
I do have two specific points.
of

advice

that

the

woman

should

First, the type
and

have

this

is

particularly true of the minor and indeed of many other
distraught and

frightened

health

in

"risks"

women

-

the conventional

is

much

broader

sense of

this

than
term.

Ideally, the patient should have the personal interest and
care

of

the

devoted

family

facing an operation for

physician.

Other

than

terminal cancer or the 1 ike,

one
an

abortion patient may require more careful and sympathetic
counseling than other patients.

I would guess that many

women - particularly those of strong religious convictions
or who have been raised in strict families - have a sense
of guilt and need counseling in its genuine sense.
am not

And I

implying negative advice against the exercise of

I •
2.

the woman's discretion.

Rather, only that her discretion

be exercised understandably.
It
frame
meet.

a

is

not

easy

to

articulate

requirement

that

draftsmen

of

this

much

less

legislation must

I do suggest trying some broader formulation than

the term "risk". There should be more than

merely reading

a "Miranda-type" warning of what might happen but usually
doesn't.
My second point is to include a paragraph -

it

can be a brief one - to the effect that a state is free to
license persons duly found to be qualified to perform the
important advising function.

There is an analogy here of

the licensing by states of practical nurses and of the use
in the Armed Services of carefully trained paramedics.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

-

•

., F

men

01/31/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Akron, Nos. 81-746, 81-1172

This memo deals with Part IV, on parental consent.
Your memo on this section suggests that the discussion of
standing and abstention be placed in footnotes.

This suggests

that my draft failed to make clear that all that Akron argues are
the standing and abstention points.
Akron does

not contend that the Ohio Juvenile Court does

provide the alternative procedure required in Bellotti II.

It

argues only that this might be such an alternative, and therefore
that CA6

should

not have

invalidated §1870.05(B)

on its face.

E.g., "Unless and until the section is challenged by a minor who
claims

to

1870.05(B)

be

mature

or

emancipated,

a

holding

that

Section

is unconstitutional would be improper and premature."

(Brief at 28.)

(See also attached photocopies of relevant pages

of Akron's briefs.)
All that the Court needs to decide is whether the Akron ordinance, combined with the existing Ohio juvenile procedures, is
susceptible of being construed as providing the requisite alternative procedure.

The answer clearly is no.

If you agree, I propose to rewrite the section to emphasize
that abstention would serve no purpose, for the reasons generally
given already.
in a footnote.

I agree that the standing analysis should be put

•

Thus, it is not to be assumed that during the
"

•

•

#UOh- ~~

review under such circumstances as the statute was

course of the juvenile proceedings the Court will nQt

capable of a constitutional construction. This Court

construe the ol'din ance in a mannel' consistent w·

stated:

In Bellotti I, supra, and in Matheson, supra, this Court

In Bellotti I, ·s upra, we unanimously
declined to pass on constitutional
challenges to an abortion regulation
statute
because
the
statute
was
'susceptible of a construction by the state
judiciary which . might avoid in whole or in
part
the
necessity
for
federal
constitutional adjudication, or at least
materially change the nature of the
problem.' Id., at 147, quoting Harrison v.
NAACP, 36o U.S. 167, 177 (1959). See
Kle e v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546,
547 1976); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority,
297
U.S.
288,
346-347
(l936)(concurring opinion). We reaffirm
that approach and find it controlling here
insofar
as appellant challenges
a
purported statutory exclusion of mature
and emancipated minors. 450 U.S. at 407.

refused to strike down legislation on its face without

While the statute in Matheson dealt

a state court's determination as to construction and

parental notification rather than parental or judicial

application of the laws in question .

consent, the principles enunciated by this Court are

e constitutional requirement of a determination of
t he mmor's ability to make an mformed consent.
Indeed it is abundantly clear thnt there is no one
better able to determine a minor's maturity and
hence her ability to make a decision regarding
abor·tion.

Admittedly the abortion clinics are not

making any such de t erm inat ion. (Tr. VII, 166, 174).
So construed, the r egula tion is constitutionally
permissible.

Unless

and

until

the

section

is

challenged by a minor who claim s to be mature or
emancipated, a holding that Section 1870.05(B) is
unconstitutional would be improper and premature.

Th e constitutional challenge by the plaintiff in
Matheson, based upon overbreadth, was denied as she

equally applicable in the present case.

with

[See also,

New York v. Ferber, _ _ U.S. _ _ , _ _ (1982)].

lncked standing to advance the argument. This Court

B.

noted: "We need not reach that question since she did
not allege or pl'offer any evidence that either she or

Minors
Recently, this Court vacated the decision of

any member of her class is mature or emancipated.

the Court of Appeals, in Thone, supra, wherein it had

450

u.s.

Important State Interest in Protection of

held a parental consultation requirement

405-406.

The overbreadth argument was not subject to
-28-

to be

unconstitutional. In vacating the Court of Appeals'
-29-

~

-

•

-·~-......__

reversal of the Court of Appeals decision.
Section 1870.05(B) is ....capable of a construction
that would render it constitutional. It is not to be
assumed that an Ohio juvenile court proceedings will
construe the ordinance in a manner inconsistent with
the constitutional requirements. Thus, as noted by
.Judge_ Kennedy in her disSenting.· opinion, :section
1870.05(B) is.not facially invalid. (App. 33a). As no
minOt" challenges Section -1-870.0S(t3), UQ_ party. before
this Court has standing to challenge the sectio_Q, and
it _is premature to hold - it, unconstitutional.

·This

Court has consistently refused to strike down
legislation on its face without a state court
determination as to construction and application of

•

the laws.

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.

398, 407

(1981), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In
order to have standing to challenge Section
1870.05(B) as applied, it must be challenged by a
minor under the age of fifteen who alleges she is
mature or emancipated. Thus, the decision of the
lower court should be reversed.
Even if this Court should find Petitioners
waived their right to appeal the issue of Section
1870.0S(B)'s constitutionality, the Petitioners cannot
_waive the question of standing or--. ·the -. rights of
Defendants-Intervenors .
.ill.

THE STATE HAS: A -LEGITIMA-TE •

-s-·

••

__

..........

lfp/ss 01/31/83

Rider A, p. 58 Akron

AKRONSB SALLY-POW
Section 1870.06(B) specifies a litany of information that
the woman's attending physician is required to provide
~,_

orally.

The patient t:-fl.efl io req1:1ired

form acknowledging that she .

.

.

"sign[] a consent

"'

[has] been informed" as

to all of the required information.
seven separate paragraphs quotd

~

This is set forthf n

in full in n. 4, p.

supra, and need not be repeated here.
Section 1870.06(B)

-----------------

all of the

information as "facts" though it is evident that most of
it is a matter of opinion and professional opinion at
that.

Moreover, it is clear that some of the information

required is designed to influence the woman not to undergo
an abortion.

The physician must inform his patient that

2.

"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of
conception" §l870.06(B) (3).

In Roe v. Wade this Court

declined to permit a state to prohibit abortions based on
the theory that life began at conception, see 410

u.s.,

at

159-162, and recognized that a state is not free to
require that a woman consider that theory in making her
decision with respect to an abortion. This same subsection
requires a "detail[ed] description of "the anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child at the gestational point of the development at which
time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not
limited to, appearance, mobility, tactical sensitivity,
including pain, perception or response, brain and heart
function, the presence of internal organs and the presence
of external members".

Apart from the unresolved and

3.

heatedly debated medical and philosophical question as to
"when human life begins", much of what is required would
involve at best speculation by the attending physician.
The other subsections of §1870.06(B) are not
as pointedly designed to influence the woman to reject
abortion.

It is fair to say, we think, that the seven

subsections viewed as a whole have this purpose.

In

addition, and equally relevant to our decision, is the
extent to which the requirements of §1870.05(B) intrude
upon the role and professional responsibility of the
attending physician.

The provisions requires a physician

to make specific statements to his patient regardless of
whether he believes the information is relevant to the
particular patient, whether all of the risks outlined in
subsection 5 exist, or whether the informaion is too

4•

speculative for a conscientious physician to express as
his opinion.

In Danforth, the Court warned against

placing the attending physician in an "undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket".
beyond discomfort.

Section 1870.06(B) goes far

It would place a conscientious

physician in an impossible situation, and one contrary to
the public interest in encouraging integrity and high
professional standards in the medical profession.

* * *
Mark and Jim:

I do not suggest that the foregoing is

either complete or properly framed.

It is merely

illustrative of a way substantially to shorten this
portion of the opinion, with focus on the most offensive

5.

requirements.

To "coin a phrase", go for the "jugular"

and forget the fringe arguments.

Perhaps it is desirable

to add - in text or a footnote - all or some abbreviation
of subsection 5.

This also is a parade of "horribles".

- ..

..

Rider A, p. 72 {Akron)

lfp/ss 01/31/83
AKRON72 SALLY-POW

-;

The question we must ask is whether the ;s tate interest/(
are significantly served by an arbitrary waiting period.
On balance, we think the answer is negative at least on
the record before us.

There is no evidence suggesting

that the abortion procedure is likely to be performed more
safely.

Nor, indeed, is there evidence that a period of

24 hours is likely to enhance a woman's
the risks that justify state regulation.

Our prior cases

have not identified a legitimate state interest in a
legally enforceably delay.

In Roe and subsequently cases

we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the role
of the physician.

If this is properly discharged, in

accordance with the ethical standards of the profession,

..

'

jl

2.

the physician will defer the abortion where he thinks this
will be beneficial to the patient or when he thinks a
period of further reflection by the woman would be in her
best interest.

MJ2 SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 01/31/83

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mark and Jim

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron

v'

This memorandum addresses only Part ;!7-C -

p.

64-70.

Perhaps this can be tightened up a bit,

and I

would like for you to give this a try.
I do have two specific points.
of

advice

that

the

woman

should

First, the type

have

and

this

is

particularly true of the minor and indeed of many other
distraught and

frightened women -

health

in

11

risks 11

the conventional

is

much

broader

sense of

this

than
term.

Ideally, the patient should have the personal interest and
care

of

the

devoted

family

facing an operation for

physician.

Other

than one

terminal cancer or the like,

an

abortion patient may require more careful and sympathetic
counseling than other patients.

I would guess that many

women - particularly those of strong religious convictions
or who have been raised in strict families - have a sense
of guilt and need counseling in its genuine sense.
am not

And I

implying negative advice against the exercise of

2.

the woman's discretion.

Rather, only that her discretion

be exercised understandably.
It
frame
meet.

a

is

not

easy

to

articulate

requirement

that

draftsmen

of

this

much

less

legislation must

I do suggest trying some broader formulation than

the term "risk". There should be more than

merely reading

a "Miranda-type" warning of what might happen but usually
doesn't.
My second point is to include a paragraph -

it

can be a brief one - to the effect that a state is free to
~i~

c•

MetAl\

-

f ~-

license persons duly found to be qualified to perform the
important advising function.

There is an analogy here of

the licensing by states of practical nurses and of the use
in the Armed Services of carefully trained paramedics.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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Rider A, p. 58 Akron

AKRON58 SALLY-POW
1870.06{8) specifies a litany of information that
the woman's attending physician is required to provide
~~The patient tR-efl is .rQ"}ttir.:ed to "sign[] a consent

"\

form acknowledging that she . • • [has] been informed" as
to all of the required information.
seven separate paragraphs quotd

This is set fort~in

in full in n. 4, p.

supra, and need not be repeated here.
Section 1870.06{8)

-----------------

all of the

information as "facts" though it is evident that most of
it is a matter of opinion and professional opinion at
that.

Moreover, it is clear that some of the information

required is designed to influence the woman not to undergo
an abortion.

The physician must inform his patient that

2.

"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of
conception" §1870.06(B) (3).

In Roe v. Wade this Court

declined to permit a state to prohibit abortions based on
the theory that life began at conception, see 410

u.s.,

at

159-162, and recognized that a state is not free to
require that a woman consider that theory in making her
decision with respect to an abortion. This same subsection
requires a "detail[ed] description of "the anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child at the gestational point of the development at which
time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not
limited to, appearance, mobility, tactical sensitivity,
including pain, perception or response, brain and heart
function, the presence of internal organs and the presence
of external members".

Apart from the unresolved and

3.

heatedly debated medical and philosophical question as to
"when human life begins", much of what is required would
involve at best speculation by the attending physician.
The other subsections of §1870.06(8) are not
as pointedly designed to influence the woman to reject
abortion.

It is fair to say, we think, that the seven

subsections viewed as a whole have this

purpose. ~ n

<ff?
,

addition, and equally relevant to our decision, is the
extent to which the requirements of §1870.05(8) intrude
upon the role and professional responsibility of the
attending physician.

The provisions requires a physician

to make specific statements to his patient regardless of
whether he believes the information is relevant to the
particular patient, whether all of the risks outlined in
subsection 5 exist, or whether the informaion is too

4.

speculative for a conscientious physician to express as
his opinion.

In Danforth, the Court warned against

placing the attending physician in an "undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket".
beyond discomfort.

Section 1870.06(B) goes far

It would place a conscientious

physician in an impossible situation, and one contrary to
the public interest in encouraging integrity and high

7

professional standards in the medical profession.

* * *
Mark and Jim:

I do not suggest that the foregoing is

either complete or properly framed.

It is merely

illustrative of a way substantially to shorten this
portion of the opinion, with focus on the most offensive

..

'

)

5.

requirements.

f~: 11t ~ I

1 {{1~~~~-

To "coin a phrase", go for the "jugular"

and forget the fringe arguments.

Perhaps it is desirable

to add - in text or a footnote - all or some abbreviation

~~

k_fPi'lt
~~> of

pr- t.: 1 )'!,; ..)

subsection 5.

ifi).e..,_)4, ~--·'~

~~

This also is a parade of "horribles".

MJl SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 01/31/83

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mark and Jim

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memorandum relates only to Part V, p.

53-

70.
You will not be surprised to have me say that
the 78 pages of the draft opinion is too long.

Although

on short paper, the footnotes in particular are voluminous
and single spaced.

My guess is this would print out some

50 pages.
Until
identify

any

I

reached

major

Part

V,

of

the

segment

however,
opinion

I

did

not

that

I

feel

sound

and

confidently should be omitted.
The
straightforward,
be.

As

"sell"

analysis

of

V

is

but it may be twice as long as it need

you have heard me
a

Part

say before,

lean opinion than a wordy one.

it

is easier
Moreover,

to
the

bench and the bar justly criticize us for saying too much
both in text and notes.
My recollection is that we have a sold majority
for invalidating all of the provisions addressed in Part V

•

2.

except §1870.06(C)
OK.

-

p.

64-70.

Pages 53, 54 and 55 are

Much of the remainder of the discussion is excellent,

but I

would like to see how it reads when substantially

condensed.
I

have drafted Rider A, p.

58 as a substitute -

reduce version - for pp. 58-64.

Feel fre to improve it.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

a much

lfp/ss 01/31/83

Rider A, p. 1 (Akron}

AKRONl SALLY-POW
Note to Mark and Jim

~ These cases involve one of the most emotional
and divisive issue that confront our

society~

There is no

way this Court can signficantly defuse the issue.
may be marginal contributions that can be made.

There
What is

suggested below is a first effort at a possible note at
the outset of our opinion.

This case comes to us a decade after the Court's
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Roe v. Bolton.

In the

intervening year, in ____________ decisions cited infra in

2.

this opinion, this Court has had occasion to consider
questions that have arisen with respect to the limits of a
state's authority to regulate or forbid abortions.
Arguments have been made, and repeated in this case, that
we erred in holding that the right of privacy, grounded in
the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution, encompasses a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.

A clear majority of this

Court consistently has accepted the basic holding of Roe,
though there have been differences as to its application
in light of issues presented by a variety of state
regulation.

Under our system of government, Roe v. Wade

is the "law of the land".

While the doctrine of stare

decisis is never as persuasive on a constitutional

3.

question, it is a doctrine that demands respectj
system of law in an ordered society.

in any

We respect it today.

We add one clarifiying observation.

It is often

said that the Supreme Court approves or favors abortions.
Such a view reflects a misaprehension both of the role of
this Court and of our decisions.

It is well to remember

that Roe, and several of the subsequent cases, involved
the validity of laws that impose serious criminal
penalties on those who aid or participated in an abortion.
In many states prior to Roe, such a participant was guilt
of murder.

The consequences, now often overlooked,

included the commission of crimes by many otherwise law
abiding citizens.

But more frequently, when ethical

physicians obeyed the law, abortions were being performed
by unskilled and generally irresponsible persons at great

.

..

...

4

risk to mother and fetus.

Where abortions were not

obtainable, unwanted children were born to women who
lacked the means or the opportunity to go to a distant
state where the laws were different or abroad where
abortions were readily obtainable by those who could
afford them.

We do not suggest that these considerations

suffice to justify a constitutional decision.

The y are

perhaps relevant to a proper perspective of the broader
aspects of this subject.

I

..-

lfp/ss 01/31/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mark and Jim

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 29, 1983

Akron
This memo is confined to Part IV.
The substance of it is fine.

(p. 44).

It seems to me,

however, it requires some restructuring.
The difficulty in this respect commences on page
47 with Akron's defense of the parental consent provision.
It argues that the

juvenile court provides the necessary

alternative procedure.

This

is stated -

though perhaps

not explicitly enough -on p. 47.
After stating that Akron relies on Matheson, the
draft

first

discusses

pages 49 and 50.
the

flow

of

standing

and

then

abstention

on

What is said is good, but it interrupts

the

discussion

of

the

juvenile

court

alternative - to which the draft returns on p. 51.
I tried to do some tinkering and made a hash out
of page 49.

My suggestions is that the standing point be

relegated to a conclusory footnote.
I

am inclined also to put the abstention point

in a footnote, making it somewhat more conclusory than at

-1 . . ,..

2.

present.

The situation is quite different here where only

a city ordinance is involved.
for

believing

that

the Ohio

There is no justification
legislature

would construe

this ordinance or even its juvenile court statute.
my

recollection

standing,

of

abstention

Matheson
became

is

that

once

relatively

have not, however, read Matheson recently.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

we

Also,

found

no

unimportant.

I

men

01/31/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Akron, Nos. 81-746, 81-1172

This memo deals with Part IV, on parental consent.
Your memo on this section suggests that the discussion of
standing and abstention be placed in footnotes.

This suggests

that my draft failed to make clear that all that Akron argues are
the standing and abstention points.
Akron does

not contend that the Ohio Juvenile Court does

provide the alternative procedure required in Bellotti I I.

It

argues only that this might be such an alternative, and therefore
that CA6

should

not have

invalidated §1870.05(B)

on its face.

E.g., "Unless and until the section is challenged by a minor who
claims

to

1870.05(B}

be

mature

or

emancipated,

a

holding

that

Section

is unconstitutional would be improper and premature."

(Brief at 28.}

(See also attached photocopies of relevant pages

of Akron's briefs.}
All that the Court needs to decide is whether the Akron ordinance, combined with the existing Ohio juvenile procedures, is
susceptible of being construed as providing the requisite alternative procedure.

The answer clearly is no.

If you agree, I propose to rewrite the section to emphasize
that abstention would serve no purpose, for the reasons generally
given already.
in a footnote.

I agree that the standing analysis should be put

lfp/ss 01/31/83

Rider A, p. 1 (Akron)

AKRONl SALLY-POW
Note to Mark and Jim

These cases involve one of the most emotional
and divisive issue that confront our society.

There is no

way this Court can signficantly defuse the issue.
may be marginal contributions that can be made.

There
What is

suggested below is a first effort at a possible note at
the outset of our opinion.

This case comes to us a decade after the Court's
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Roe v. Bolton.

In the

intervening year, in - - - - - - decisions cited infra in

2.

this opinion, this Court has had occasion to consider
questions that have arisen with respect to the limits of a
state's authority to regulate or forbid abortions.
Arguments have been made, and repeated in this case, that
we erred in holding that the right of privacy, grounded in
the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution, encompasses a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.

A clear majority of this

Court consistently has accepted the basic holding of Roe,
though there have been differences as to its application
in light of issues presented by a variety of state
regulation.

Under our system of government, Roe v. Wade

is the "law of the land".

While the doctrine of stare

decisis is never as persuasive on a constitutional

3.

question, it is a doctrine that demands respects in any
system of law in an ordered society.

We respect it today.

We add one clarifiying observation.

It is often

said that the Supreme Court approves or favors abortions.
Such a view reflects a misaprehension both of the role of
this Court and of our decisions.

It is well to remember

that Roe, and several of the subsequent cases, involved
the validity of laws that impose serious criminal
penalties on those who aid or participated in an abortion.
In many states prior to Roe, such a participant was guilt
of murder.

The consequences, now often overlooked,

included the commission of crimes by many otherwise law
abiding citizens.

But more frequently, when ethical

physicians obeyed the law, abortions were being performed
by unskilled and generally irresponsible persons at great

4.

risk to mother and fetus.

Where abortions were not

obtainable, unwanted children were born to women who
lacked the means or the opportunity to go to a distant
state where the laws were different or abroad where
abortions were readily obtainable by those who could
afford them.

We do not suggest that these considerations

suffice to justify a constitutional decision.

They are

perhaps relevant to a proper perspective of the broader
aspects of this subject.

men

02/02/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Akron, Nos. 81-746, 81-1172

This memo deals with Part I I I, on the hospital issue.
particular

it concerns pp.

41-43,

In

which I have photocopied and

attached.
You have suggested eliminating this material, at least until
it becomes necessary to use

it

in response to the dissent.

I

would like to suggest a couple of reasons for retaining this discussion in some form.
First, this discussion is a response to what now is Akron's
primary

argument

quirement.

in

support

Akron does not,

of

§1870. 03' s

hospitalization

re-

and indeed cannot, any longer seri-

ously dispute that (i) a hospital requirement constitutes a burden on

the

abort ion right,

and

( i i)

cur rent evidence suggests

that D&E may be performed safely during the first part of the
second trimester.

It does argue,

though,

that overall the re-

quirement is reasonable because it promotes health at
some cases.
will have

least

in

Eliminating this discussion completely means that we
reversed

the

judgment below without responding

to a

primary argument in support of it.
Second,

the question of what is a

"reasonable regulation"

for health purposes is perhaps the most difficult issue in these
cases.

In each case the pro-abortion 1 i tigants argue that the

hospital requirement is,

in effect, "overbroad" -- it applies to

2.
certain abortions where one fairly may say that it is unnecessary
to do so.

But the Court has not said that second-trimester regu-

lations must be "necessary," or even "narrowly tailored."
required only that they be "reasonable."
becomes:

It has

The question therefore

why is it reasonable in Akron, but not in Simopoulous?

This is not a simple question to answer.

Arguments may be

made that the Virginia regulations are "overbroad" because they
are

too detailed and

necessary

require certain

in all cases.

Similarly,

things

that might not be

it may be

Virginia regulations are "unnecessary"

argued that the

for the 12th-14th weeks,

since during that period the ACOG says that abortions may be performed safely in a normal doctor's office.
The answer to these arguments presumably will be that the
Virginia requirement is reasonable overall, despite the fact that
the fit between means and ends is not perfect.

Akron can be ex-

plained as involving a much more serious and unnecessary burden - the full-scale hospitalization requirement has a drastic effect
on the availability of abortions, and it is entirely unnecessary
for several weeks in the second trimester.
It was with these points in mind that I
on
I

~

were

included pp. 41-43

the Akron hospital requirement was unreasonable.
trying

to

set

up

the outcome

in

the Virginia

Jim and
case

by

including language in Akron emphasizing that the unnecessary burden in the latter case was quite severe.

(That is why, for exam-

ple, I used the quote from Danforth.)

As you will note, Jim used

two

in

quotes

from

these

Simopoulous is different.

three

pages

order

to

explain

(See Jim's draft at p.9, p.22.)

why
His

3•

point in essence is that the variation between means and ends is
much less in the Virginia statute than in the Akron ordinance.
It may be that it is not necessary to have this interrelation between the opinions;

for example,

the Simopoulous opinion

itself could contain all of the analysis as to why Akron is distinguishable.

But I thought you at least would want to consider

the approach that Jim and I have taken.

men

02/03/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE

(/~~)

From: Mark
Re:

PO~LL

Akron, Second Draft

This memo accompanies Draft No. 2 in this case.

It explains

certain changes and raises various points for your consideration.

Introduction -- I have added the first paragraph of your Rider A,
p.l (with some revisions) to this draft.
is a useful statement.

Jim and I agree that it

We would advise against, however,

sion of your second paragraph.

Its substance is essentially a

policy argument against prohibiting abortions.
fusing the issue,

inclu-

Rather than de-

such a discussion probably would only further

provoke critics of the Court's abortion decisions.

It seems best

to leave these things unsaid.

Part I -- Nothing important was done in this background part.

Part II -- As you requested, I added some material concerning the
source of the right of privacy.

I

used a quote from Harlan in

Poe v. Ullman, and a quote from Stewart in Roe.
On p.l4 of Draft No.

1, you indicated a desire not to use

"compelling" if we didn't have to.
however,

and

any movement away

This is the holding in Roe,

from

it probably would produce

problems.
I

would point out

that the argument about the need for

a

2.

"compelling" state interest is not important.

Under Roe and Doe,

a second-trimester health regulation always supports a compelling
state interest,

as the Court said that the health interest be-

comes compelling after

the first

trimester.

Thus,

for

second-

trimester regulations the key standard is "reasonably related" -and this provides a flexible test that permits the Court to accord a measure of respect to legislative judgments.

Other Jus-

tices have tried to change that Roe standard to the more stringent "narrowly tailored" standard, but this draft adheres to Roe,
as I assume you want to do.
As to the first trimester, Roe and Doe make clear that there
are no compelling
legal

interests at

sect ion to emphasize,

all.

Yet we have writ ten this

V"

using Danforth's

recordkeeping and

informed consent holdings, that some first-trimester regulations
can be supported by "important"
--------~;_-------~

interests if the burden is not

significant.
Thus,
practical
that

a

state

I

do

effect

compelling
regulation

right.

not

431

u.s.,

"significant"

from

think
your

state
entirely
at 705.

that

this

legal

separate views

interest

test

frustrates

section departs
expressed

applies
or

only

heavily

in

in Carey,
"when

the

burdens"

the

Under the analysis in this Draft, any

second-trimester regulation does

invoke the test,

but under the Roe formulation, this requires only a "reasonable"
regulation •

. . .~~.v
"lt.vV
r

.

•

~· ~.- use

~~~ This

,c.~

J~

I

would note finally that we have consciously avoided any

of "unduly burdensome," a phrase used in many prior opinions.
caused much confusion in the lower courts; some thought it

1(-/'x~-w~~~~~~~~
VL~~~~·

*

3.

was the threshold inquiry, others thought it the final inquiry.
The phrase is not necessary.

Part III -- I have kept the analysis at pp.41-43 of Draft No. 1,
for the reasons we have discussed.
I tend to agree with your point (p.41) that we have used too
much medical evidence.
footnotes,

but I

I have made no new effort to reduce the

think we might do so later.

The lower courts

cited few of the sources we are citing, so the opinion might create an appearance

(which may well be the reality)

that we con-

ducted our own independent analysis of the medical literature.
At p.31, 33, and 39 (your rider A), you added qualifiers to
the phrases

"women seeking an abortion,"

"a woman's ability to

obtain an abortion," and "the right of a woman to have an abortion."
fusing

In my judgment these tend to make the passages more conand

awkward,

without

adding

anything.

Throughout

this

draft, as in prior decisions, there is a repeated emphasis on the
role of the physician.

I do not believe it detracts from that

emphasis or otherwise constitutes a departure from precedent to
use some statements that simply say that it is "the woman" who
has the right or who seeks the abortion.
left these changes out of this draft,

On this basis, I have

but of course wanted to

inform you of it so you could decide otherwise.

Part IV -- I have revised the section as we discussed, emphasizing that there was no reason for the courts to have abstained,
and putting the standing discussion in a footnote.

I also have

4.
reduced old fn. 34 substantially (though perhaps still not sufficiently), and have combined it with old fn. 33.

Part V -- The whole section has been reworked.

~r
~k

~·

3~

trY[r

In view of your

concern that "informed consent" be construed broadly, I have had
to eliminate my narrow reading of Danforth and my emphasis on its
limitation to physical health risks.

I

have

found

useful lan-

guage in prior opinions to make the point that emotional health
matters as well.

~~1111

k r
~

I am somewhat uncomfortable with V B as it stands.

'ng Akron's main brief, pp. 32-37, I note that Akron did not

e ~effort

-------

to defend subsections (3),

lar" for which we have gone. 1
(1),
the

On re-

(2),

(6),

(4),

(5) -- the "jugu-

Rather, Akron's argument was that

(7) were clearly acceptable, and that in light of

ordinance's

severability

provision,

these

four

sections

should have been upheld.
I must say that,

in view of your more expansive definition

of informed consent, I am hard pressed to say why there is anything wrong in requiring disclosure of such things as the availability
agencies.

of

birth
The

control,

"litany"

adoption,

objection

and

does

pregnancy
not

seem

assistance

dispositive,

1 Resps argued in their brief that Akron has conceded the
unconstitutionality of (3), (4), and (5).
In a reply brief Akron
denied this, and proceeded, in less than one page, to try to
defend them. E.g., "To contend that the unborn fetus is not
human life ignores the obvious." Reply Brief at p.8. But for
all practical purposes Akron has abandoned these three
provisions, and seeks only to save the other four.

5.
since (1) and (2) are extremely brief and (6) and
in terms of general subject matter.

And I

(7) are framed

also do not see why

these could not be severed; they are not invariably tied to the
clearly unconstitutional parts,
ability provision.

and Akron did

include a

sever-

At the least, given that this is effectively

the only argument Akron raises in defense of 1870.06(B), it seems
a little unfair for the Court to ignore the argument entirely.
I

suppose

the Court could

fall

back

on

the

holding,

set

forth as to subsection (C), that the city may not require physicians to give the information.

But to say that would require an

affirmative statement that it is legitimate to require disclosure
of the items in

(1),

(2),

(6),

and

(7).

Thus far we have pre-

tended that these provisions do not exist.

Part VI -- This section is much reduced,

and written along the

lines of your rider.

Part VII -- This section also has been reduced substantially.

.,

men

02/03/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Akron, Second Draft

This memo accompanies Draft No. 2 in this case.

It explains

certain changes and raises various points for your consideration.

Introduction -- I have added the first paragraph of your Rider A,
p.l (with some revisions)
is a useful statement .

to this draft .

Jim and I agree that it

We would advise against, however, inclu-

sion of your second paragraph.

Its substance

is essentially a

policy argument against prohibiting abortions.

Rather than de-

fusing the issue,

such a discussion probably would only further

provoke critics of the Court's abortion decisions.

It seems best

to leave these things unsaid.

Part I -- Nothing important was done in this background part.

Part II -- As you requested, I added some material concerning the
source of the right of privacy.

I

used a quote from Harlan in

Poe v. Ullman, and a quote from Stewart in Roe.
On p.l4 of Draft No.
"compelling"
however,

and

1, you indicated a desire not to use

if we didn't have to.
any movement away

This is the holding in Roe,

from

it

probably would produce

problems.
I

would point out

that the argument about the need for

a

2.
"compelling" state interest is not important.

Under Roe and Doe,

a second-trimester health regulation always supports a compelling
state

interest,

as

the Court said

comes compelling after

the

first

that the health
trimester.

Thus,

interest befor

second-

trimester regulations the key standard is "reasonably related"

-~

and this provides a flexible test that permits the Court to accord a measure of respect to legislative judgments.

Other Jus-

tices have tried to change that Roe standard to the more stringent "narrowly tailored" standard, but this draft adheres to Roe,
as I assume you want to do.
As to the first trimester, Roe and Doe make clear that there
are

no compelling

legal

interests

sect ion to emphasize,

informed consent holdings,
can be

at

all.

using

Yet we have written this

Danforth's

recordkeeping

and

that some first-trimester regulations

supported by "important"

interests

if the burden is not

significant.
Thus,
practical
th at

a

I

do

effect

c omp elling
regulation

state
right.

not
from

think
your

state
entirely

431 U.S., at 705.

"s igni f ican t"

that

this

separate

int e r es t

legal
views

t es t

frustrates

section departs
expressed

applies
or

onl y

heavily

in

in Carey,
"wh e n

the

burdens"

the

Under t h e analysis in this Draft, any

second-trimester

but under the Roe formulation,

regulation does

invoke

the test,

this requires only a "reasonable"

regulation.
I

would

note finally

that we have consciously avoided any

use of "unduly burdensome," a phrase used in many prior opinions.
This caused much confusion in the lower courts;

some thought it

3.

was the threshold

inquiry, others thought it the final

inquiry.

The phrase is not necessary.

Part III -- I have kept the analysis at pp.41-43 of Draft No. 1,
for the reasons we have discussed.

r

I tend to agree with your point (p.41) that we have used too
much medical evidence.
footnotes,

but I

I have made no new effort to reduce the

think we might do so later.

The lower courts

cited few of the sources we are citing, so the opinion might create an appearance

(which may well be the reality)

that we con-

ducted our own independent analysis of the medical literature.
At p.31, 33, and 39
the phrases

(your rider A), you added qualifiers to

"women seeking an abortion,"

"a woman's ability to

obtain an abortion," and "the right of a woman to have an abortion."
fusing

In my judgment these tend to make the passages more conand

awkward,

without

adding

anything.

Throughout

this

draft, as in prior decisions, there is a repeated emphasis on the
role of

the physician.

I

do not believe it detracts from that

emphasis or otherwise constitutes a departure from precedent to
use some statements that simply say that it is "the woman" who
has the right or who seeks the abortion.
left

these changes out of

this draft,

On this basis, I have

but of course wan ted to

inform you of it so you could decide otherwise.

Part IV -- I have revised the section as we discussed, emphasizing that there was no reason for

the courts to have abstained,

and putting the standing discuss ion in a footnote.

I

also have

4.
reduced old fn. 34 substantially (though perhaps still not sufficiently), and have combined it with old fn. 33.

Part V -- The whole section has been reworked.

In view of your

concern that "informed consent" be construed broadly, I have had ·
to eliminate my narrow reading of Danforth and my emphasis on its
limitation to physical health

risks.

I

have

found

useful

lan-

guage in prior opinions to make the point that emotional health
rna t ter s as well.
I

am somewhat uncomfortable with V B as it stands.

On re-

reading Akron's main brief, pp. 32-37, I note that Akron did not
make

~effort

to defend subsections (3),

lar" for which we have gone. 1
(1),
the

(2),

(6),

(4),

(5)

-- the "jugu-

Rather, Akron's argument was that

(7) were clearly acceptable, and that in light of

ordinance's

severability

provision,

these

four

sections

should have been upheld.
I

rnus t

say that,

of informed consent,

in view of your more expansive definition
I

am hard pressed to say why there is any-

thing wrong in requiring disclosure of such things as the availability
agencies.

of

birth
ThE:

11

control,
1 i tany 11

adoption,

object ion

and

does

pregnancy
not

seem

assistance

dispositive,

1 Resps argued in their brief that Akron has conceded the
unconstitutionality of (3), (4), and (5).
In a reply brief Akron
denied this, and proceeded, in less than one page, to try to
defend them. E.g., "To contend that the unborn fetus is not
human life ignores the obvious." Reply Brief at p.B. But for
all practical purposes Akron has abandoned these three
provisions, and seeks only to save the other four.

5.
since (1)

and

(2) are extremely brief and

in terms of general subject matter .

(6)

And I

and

(7)

are framed

also do not see why

these could not be severed : they are not invariably tied to the
clearly unconstitutional parts ,
ability provision.

and Akron did

include a

sever-

At the least, given that this is effectively,.

the only argument Akron raises in defense of 1870.06(B), it seems
a little unfair for the Court to ignore the argument entirely.
I

suppose

the

Court could

fall

back

on

the

holding,

set

forth as to subsection (C), that the city may not require physicians to give the information.

But to say that would require an

affirmative statement that it is legitimate to require disclosure
of the items in

(1),

(2),

(6),

and

(7).

Thus far we have pre-

tended that these provisions do not exist.

Part VI

-- This section is much reduced,

and written along the

lines of your rider.

P art VII -- This section also has been reduced substantially.

•

- .....

lfp/ss 02/21/83

Rider A, p.

(Akron)

AKRONB SALLY-POW
Note to Jim and Mark:
We

-

have discussed

note commenting on
a nd

nature

clinics.
Akron.

of

whether

and

the wide variations

the

medical

service

where

to put

a

in the character

and

procedures

in

Such a note could be added to subpart IV-C in
(The "attending physician" issue.)

What follows

is a pretty rough draft.

The

central

role

of

the

physician

in

the

abortion counseling and procedure has been emphasized in
our cases from Roe to Mathe son(?) •
course,

is

physician,
:

the
one

competent,

whose

The ideal model,

conscientious

primary concern

is

and

the

of

ethical

health

well being of the patient and the fetus when viable.

and
A

decade of experience since Roe has demonstrated, however,
that this role model is not always typical.

As is true of

other professions, adherence to ethical standards varies.
Moreover,
time

and

as abortions may be performed
with

a

modest

investment

in

in a minimum of
facilities

and

equipment, the opportunity for high financial rewards from

2.

providing

abortions

almost on an "assembly line"

has not been overlooked.

See,

for example,

basis,

the mode of

operation of one clinic:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the
day the abortion is to be performed . . . .
It
lasts for two hours and takes place in groups
that include both minors and adults who are
strangers to one another •
. The physician
takes no part in this counseling process . . . .
Counseling is typically limited to a description
of abortion procedures, possible complications,
and birth control techniques • •
"The abortion itself takes five to seven
minutes • . . The physician has no prior contact
with the minor, and on the day that abortions
are
being performed
at
the
[clinic],
the
physician,
. . may be performing abortions on
many other adults and minors
. On busy
days patients are scheduled in separate groups,
consisting usually of five patients
After the abortion [the physician] spends a
brief period with the minor and others in the
group in the recovery room . . . . "
Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 32
(1976} (Stewart, J., concurring} n. 2, at p. 91.
The counseling
to last for two hours.

in the clinic described is said
But it occurred on a group basis,

including minors and adults, and the physician "takes no
part".
need

Though we hold

not

be

given by the physician personally,

explicitly clear
being

in this case that the counseling

adequately

that he

is responsible

counseled

-::::::::===:==
:.....-----

by

himself

for
or

we make

the patient
a

qualified

- ..

..
3•

assistant.

Nor,

in

view

of

the

sensitive

and

highly

personal nature of the abortion decision, would counseling
in groups rather than individually be appropriate.
We
medical

have

no

basis

practices

or

inadequate

prevalent,
clinic.

or

We

that

are

they

for

are

satisfied

saying

that

counseling

tolerated

that

such

in

unethical

are

widely

respondent's

practices

are

not

compatible with the high ethical standards of the medical
profession.
adopting

We

do

statutes

think,

or

however,

regulations

that

in

a

state

furtherance

in
of

its

legitimate interests - properly may take into account that
generally

accepted medical

and

counseling

practices

are

Warrick

have

not invariably followed.

* * *
Note

to

published
clinics

Jim

and

a

book

Mark:
on

in Chicago,

Kennedy's

concurring

If

their

we

Zekeman

and

investigation

should cite it.

and

dissenting

merits citing as a "see also".

of

abortion

Possibly,
opinion

in

Judge
Akron

The brief for Womankind,

Inc. quoted from a couple of district court opinions that
you might take a look at.
If we

include a note along

the above 1 ines

Akron, a cross cite to it should be made in Simopoulos.

in

<l}qmi qf tlrt ~itt~ j;faUg
Jlas!finghtn. !}. <!f. 2ll&i'!~

~u:p:rmtt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 2, 1983

Re:

81-746 & 81-1172 - City of Akron

v. Akron Center for Repro. Health
Dear Lewis:
This morning I read through your draft opinion. I
believe I will be able to join it without any
significant modifications. I was particularly
interested in Part IV because you and I took different
approaches in Bellotti II, but I think the way you have
written that sect1on I w1ll have no difficulty in
joining your opinion although I may add a comment or
two in a separate writing. I also have a slight
problem with the last sentence in footnote 10 on page
9. Perhaps you could either delete the sentence and
merely cite the plurality opinion in Bellotti II or
else we could develop a minor language change such as
"a Majority of the Court has also concluded
"
This, however, is really just a flyspeck.
Another flyspeck on another subject: On
you refer to "the medical decision to perform
adoption." Perhaps it would be better to say
like the "medical aspects of the decision" or
the "medical consequences" of the decision.

page 30,
the
something
perhaps

On the whole, I think the opinion is excellent. I
may, of course, have other suggestions after I read
what you propose in the other cases, but I expect to
have no difficulty in joining this circulation. Thanks
for sharing it with me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

.;§nprmu QJ!turt 1tf tlft ~tth .;§tldtS'

JilnYJringfltn. ~. <!J.

•

2!1,?~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 4, 1983

Re:

81-746 & 81-1172 - City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Repro. Health

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

~u:.prttttt <!faurt cf tlrt ~tb ~tafts

jiras!rhtgtcn. ~. <!f. 21!~)1.~

•

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WI L LIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 7, 1983
Re:

Nos. 81-746 & 81-1172 City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.

Dear Lewis:
I will await Sandra's writing.
Sincerel~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

jnttrttttt {!J!lttrf ttf

tqt 'Jnitt~ jtatt~

Jla,sfrhtgton.11l. (!J.

2llbiJ!~

C H AMBERS OF

J U STICE SANDRA D A Y o'CO NN OR

March 7, 1983

/

City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.
No. 81-1172 Akron Center for Reproductive Health
v. City of Akron
No. 81-746

Dear Lewis,
As you already know, I have a different view
in this matter.
In due course, I will circulate
something.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

..
men

03/08/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

City of Akron, No. 81-746

My responses to Justice BLACKMON's letter are as follows:
{1)

HAB

suggests a

slight change

to account

that some of the information might not be accurate.
that his objection is trivial.

for

the

fact

My view is

If certain agencies don't exist,

no doctor would be convicted for failing to tell the women that
they did.

I would note that in this case the abortion clinics

argued that even §1870.06{B) {1)
the woman she

-- requiring the doctor to tell

is pregnant -- might

be

"inaccurate" because in

very early cases a doctor might not be positive she is pregnant.
I

find

this

silly,

and

reflective of a

view that

in abortion

cases we should construe a statute not to avoid a constitutional
problem, but to create one!
Despite this view,

I would go along with HAB's suggestion,

for it does not have any substantive effect.

{2)
think
cite

I have no objection to this alteration, though I don't

it is particularly useful.
to Simopoulos

printed

statement

in

fn.

there

28

may

referred

One thing I would note:
be
to

a

little off point;

post-abortion

rather than to counseling as to the decision.
delete the reference.

the
the

procedures,

Perhaps we should

•
(3)

&

deleted,

(4)

•

This relates to fn.

39.

I

2.

suppose it should be

in light of HAB's and WJB's request.

An attempt to re-

?
I

write it to be less pointed would, I think, destroy its function.

(5) We should stick with "reasonable."
in substance:
d er 1. ves

f

"As you state,

rom Roe an d Doe.

such as Danforth.

I

I would say to HAB,

the "reasonably related" standard

We

~~
..
~eed 1 t 1n

subsequent cases

believe that my analysis at pp.

fully consistent with our precedents.

15-16

is

I also believe it is en-

tirely consistent with protecting the woman's abortion right as
well as the State's important interest in health.
prefer

not

to alter

the standard.

As you say,

I

therefore

the outcome in

Akron is not affected by this choice."

(6) HAB makes a valid point that we have treated Bellotti II
as

if

it were

should do.
five votes.

HAB

a

majority opinion.
is correct

Yet

that Bellotti

I'm not

sure

what

we

II has not commanded

But it is equally true that the TM-WJB-HAB position

of absolute ban on any parental/judicial consent requirement has
never

achieved

a

majority

either.

Because

your

opinion

in

Bellotti II stands in the middle, it was the controlling view
HAB cannot say you are wrong that if a State did not provide for
an alternative consent procedure,
invalidated.

Therefore,

the State's statute would be

for now I would leave this alone.

Per-

,____
~----------'-----haps we could tinker with the
language
to play down Bellotti II a

little.

3.
My response to Justice BRENNAN's memo is as follows:
(1) I have no objection to the change to "many" minors.

(2)

I

am willing to delete everything in fn.

last sentence.

23 up to the

WJB is correct that we don't need this.

~ which

HAB didn't like either, should be deleted.

) ~ 1/f 0-?Z

•

~tntt

<!Jcttrl cf flrt ~~ jhdt.s

Jfa,g~ !fl. <q. 2llp~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN , J R .

Dear Lewis:
Your opinion in this case is an admirable job, and
it shows how much careful thought went into it. My only
qualms about it relate to three footnotes, and if you can
see your way clear to making some adjustments I shall be
happy to join.
At note 10, in the second sentence of text, would
you consider qualifying somewhat your statement about
minors, so that the second half of the sentence would say
something like " • • • this Court has recognized that many
minors are less capable than adults • • • "?
At notes 23 and 24, it may not be wise to say that
D&E and induction of labor through intrauterine instillation are the only two principal medical techniques for
second-trimester abortions. As I understan0. it, there
are a number of hybrid methods, involving, for instance,
instillation and artificial evacuation (rather than induced labor). Also, there may well be substances used in
instillation procedures other than prostaglandin or hypertonic saline solutions. Shouldn't we take care not to
imply that our opinion depends on a view of medical practice that is already outdated? To explain the statements
in text, it would suffice merely to say that when Roe was
decided the D&E procedure was not used after the 12th
week, and instillation procedures were not used until the
16th week.
Finally, I am uncomfortable with note 39. I see no
reason to quote so extensively from the briefs in
Bellotti I, and except for the complete lack of individualized counseling before the abortion the description
does not indicate patent abuses. Although it may well be
true that some abortion clinics do not meet the standards
of medical ethics, I would like to avoid making a general
statement to that effect, unsupported by a specific
record. It gives aid and comfort to those who would jus-

- 2 -

tify burdensome regulation on the basis of purportedly
widespread ethical violations without investigating
whether such violations are in fact occurring. Would you
consider deleting this footnote?
Once more, let me express my admiration for the work
you have put into this. I hope we can resolve these comparatively minor differences.
Since ely,

Justice Powell
The Conference

j)nvrtnu <!}lttlrl of tqt ~b ,itattg

._-rudtittglott. ~ . <!}. 2ll.;t~$

March 8, 1983

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 81-746)

City of Akron v. Akron Center for
for Reproductive Health, Inc.
No. 81-1172) Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron

Dear Lewis:
You have written, I feel, a strong and positive opinion
for these cases, and I expect to be able to join it.
I have the following somewhat minor suggestions, however,
which I offer for your consideration:
1.
In footnote 37 on page 27, 8th line, would you consider inserting the words "to the extent it is accurate," or
something like that, after the words "type of information"?
The Akron ordinance, it seems to me, requires the giving of
certain information even though it may be inaccurate.
Thus,
for example, the woman is to be told that numerous public and
private agencies and services are available to assist her.
Sometimes such agencies and services are not available in the
particular locality.
2.
In footnote 28 on page 30, next to the last line,
would you consider inserting words such as "for most patients"
after the words "relevant information"?
For some patients,
such as a 40 year old experienced obstetrical nurse, a printed
statement might very well equate with adequate counseling.
3. The same kind of problem comes to the surface in the
last paragraph of footnote 39 on page 31. I would feel happier if that paragraph could begin with "In most cases such

"
4. Actually, I would prefer to see footnote 39 omitted
in its entirety. We all know that there are rascals in the
medical profession as there are in the legal profession.
5. On pages 15 and 16 there is stress on "reasonable."
This, admittedly is drawn from Roe.
Ordinarily, however,
regulations that infringe on a fundamental right must be narrowly drawn.
If you could say so, I would be more conte~t.
Such an addition would not change the substance of the oplnion.

J

•

Page 2.

6.
I was somewhat concerned initially with your rather
emphatic reliance on Bellotti II on page 21 of your opinion.
I would have preferred to have you soften this a little since
the Bellotti II position has never commanded five votes.
I
shall leave this, however, to your discretion.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

•
March 9, 1982
Bl-746 City of Akron v. Akron Center
Dear Bill:
Thank you for your letter.
I wi 1 be glad to make the changes in notes 10, 23
and 24 that you suggest. I assume you would have no objection to leaving the last sentence in note 23.
As both you and Harry are uncomfortable with note
39 as it is presently written, I will certainly defer substantially to your views. I had thought from the discussion
at Conference that we were of one mind, namely, that abortion mills do exist, and are operated to the great profit of
unethical physicians who care little about their patients in
the normal sense of the patient/physician relationship. I
know from conversations with ethical physicians that this
type of "practice" is condemned and viewed as reflecting
adversely on the entire profession.
I will, however, omit entirely the quotation from
Danforth, and reduce n. 39 to read substantially as follows:

•This Court's consistent recognition of the
critical role of the physician in the abortion procedure has been based on the model of
the competent, conscientious and ethical phySlClan. See Doe, 410 u.s., at 196-197. We
have no occasion in this case to consider
conduct by physicians that may depart from
this model. Cf., Danforth, 428 u.s., at 9192, n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
brief fro appellant in Bellotti I. OT 1975,
pp. 43-44) •

Harry.

I do appreciate the suggestions from you and
I am writing him a separate letter.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

March 9, 1982
81-746 City of Akron v. Akron Center
Dear Harry:
This is a reply to your helpful letter of March 8.
I am glad to make the changes suggested in vou r
paragraphs 1 and 2.
As I have indicated in my letter of this date to
Bill Brennan, I am making a substantial revision in fn. 39
on p. 31. I t ink the change will fully meet the reservations that you and he expressed.
You mention the possibility that, on pages 15 and
16 of my opinion, I may unduly stress the word "reasonable•.
There is, as you imply, arguably some tension between the
fundamental right of the woman and the comPelling interest
of the state when addressing regulat'ons with respect to the
second-trimester period. It seems to me that you resolved
this satisfactorily in Roe and Doe by reliance on the reasonableness standard.
e adhered to this standard in Danforth. I therefore think that what I have written in this
respect is entirely consistent with our precedents. It also
is consistent, I think, with fully protecting the woman's
abortion right as well as the state's interest in health.
If we change the reasonableness standard to a "narrowly
drawn" standard, it seems to me this might upset the sound
balance established in our prior decisions. Of course, a
regulation not only has to be reasonable in the common sense
meaning of this term, it also - as I have emphasized - must
be reasonably related to the state's interest in the preservation and protection of maternal health.
As to my reliance on Bellotti II, I think it is
the most relevant precedent on the parental consent issue
and therefore must be cited. I will make clear that it was
a plurality opinion, though in view of the other opinions it
is controlling at present.
Again, my thanks. I am having a second draft
printed that will incorporate the changes discussed in my
letters to you and Bill Brennan.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR .

March 9, 1983

No. 81-746

City of Akron v. Akron Center

Dear Lewis:
The changes you suggest are fine.
giving them such prompt consineration.
join your opinion in this case.

Thank you for
I am happy to

Sincerely,

w-IB I )..1
WJB, Jr.
Justice Powell
The Conference

•
Qfourl ttf tlrt 1!tnittb ,jtatts
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~tnu

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N

Re:

March 10, 1983

No. 81-746,

City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.
No. 81-1172, Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v . City of Akron

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your recirculation of March 10.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

,ju.prtnu <!fottrl ttf t£rt ~b ,jtaftg

1JasJrittghm.10. <If.

2!lgtJ!.~

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 14, 1983

Re:

Nos. 81-746 and 81-1172 - Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health and Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. Akron

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

e

e

Ju.prtmt <ijau:rtaf tJrt :Jlnittb .itatts
-ztsfringhm. ~. (!}. 2llgi'l~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 5, 1983
Re:

No. 81-746 · ) City of Akron v. Akron Center for
) Reproductive Health
No. 81-1172) Akron Center for Reproductive Health
v. city of Akron

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerel~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

·~

0

lfp/ss 05/06/83

Rider A, p.

{Akron)

AKRONR SALLY-POW
Jim and Mark:

Consider adding a footnote along the

following lines, possibly as the first footnote in the
opinion:

l~ There~

,

are compelling reasons for adhering

),_
to stare de~is in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade.

f\
That case was considered with special care.

It was first

argued during the 1971 Term, and reargued - with extensive
briefing - the following Term.

The decision was joined by

the Chief Justice and six Justices.

Since Roe was decided

~~

in February 1973, at least a majority of the Court has
~rlRe~p ~

.

decisions).

.

"" ~
~:

~

· ---h ere c1' t e
es . 1· ~ Tm,

A

-

9ntFI today a~stie@~

'

.

.

2.

the post-Roe cases has challenged Roe basi
i'\

olding that a woman has a fundamental right to make
personal decision whether or not to terminate
pregnancy.

(~:

Is

Today, the dissenting opinion rejects the basic
premise of Roe and its progeny.

Curiously, rather than

forthrightly arguing that Roe should be overruled, the
dissent adopts reasoning that would accomplish precisely
this for all practical purpose.

In effect, the dissent

says that "even assuming that there is a fundamental right
to terminate pregnancy in some limited situations", post,
at p. 10, it would hold that even in the unspecified
"limited situations" the state's "compelling interest"
extends "throughout pregnancy" post, at 8, 10, (emphasis

,.,.;-

. -

~

~ ~~' d.4;aA'a"r::--~~

in original)·~ that the state only~eed show a rational

,_

. . .,...

3.

basis for any burden or limitation it chooses to apply to
preclude a woman from exercising her "limited right". r;he
dissent argues, for example,that states lawfully may
require all abortions - including those performed long

h,t..c..~

prior to viability - in acute, general care hospitals.

It

"\
requires no great familiarity with the cost and limited
availability of such hospitals to appreciate that the
views of dissenting Justices, could drive the performance
of many abortions back underground free of effective
regulation and often without the attendance of a
physician.

.:§u:pumt Qfttmi of tqt 2furi.ttlt ~ta.ttS'
~~ lB . ~· 2 0~Jl.~

/

CHAMBERS OF"

J US T ICE BYR O N R . WH IT E

Re:

May 6, 1983

81-746

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., et al.
)

81-1172) Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et
al. v. City of Akron, et al.
Dear Sandra:
Please add my name to your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

~
I

men 5/7/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

MARK
City of Akron -- Response to the dissent
With respect to the footnote you have decided to add

on p.2, I have the following thoughts:
-The reason I divided your material between the text and
the footnote was that it seemed that two separate points were
being made:

(i) Roe should be followed, and (ii) SOC chooses

not to follow it.

The first point is more important -- indeed,

it is the whole point of the second paragraph of your opinion -and I therefore thought it should go in text.
-One of the things that concerned me in this regard is
that two or three clerks from other chambers have commented to
Jim and me that they read your invocation of stare decisis as
being defensive and apologetic.

In other words, they thought

you might be saying that "we are going to· follow Roe even if
it might have been a mistake."
sion you wish to convey.

Clearly that is not the impres-

In order to make this clear, I added

the sentence "We continue to believe that Roe v. Wade was correctly decided" to the text.

I thought an affirmative state-

ment to that effect would leave no doubt about your views.
-In the same vein, I am a little worried about putting
all of the new discussion in the footnote as you have suggested.
The text now would read something like:

"And arguments continue

to be made, in these cases as well, that we erred in interpreting the Constitution.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of stare deci-

sis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed
by the rule of law.

We respect it today."

I am afraid this

would be even more susceptible of interpretation as a statement

-2~

I

that the Court is going to follow Roe regardless of whether
it was right or wrong.

Of course, the footnote would suggest

otherwise -- but while the text might get wide publicity, the
footnote might not.
-I am not suggesting that you delete any reference to
stare decisis, but I do think there should be a clear indication, in the text, that the Court remains convinced that Roe
~

HA

was correct.

If it appears that stare decisis is the central

basis of the decision, I think the opinion will have failed.

~

~. _f m thinking particularly of Justice Brennan's extremely defen~~A~ 1 ve invocation of stare decisis in Karcher v.

~1
~

Daggett, and
how unpersuasive his entire opinion was to me.
(I also would
note that

Pennhurst can be attacked on stare decisis

grounds, as a whole line of cases is partially repudiated.)
-All of this is simply to set forth for you my general
strategic/organizational concerns with respect to this opening
portion of the opinion.

I certainly did not, by the suggestions

I made, intend to alter the substance of your views.
As to the particular changes I would suggest, I think
your first draft is preferable to the second (yellow paper)
draft.

The substance is fine, with the possible exception of

the statement that the dissent believes "the state only need
show a rational basis for any burden or limitation it chooses
to apply to preclude a woman from exercising her 'limited
right.'"

As we discussed yesterday, I think this is a little

too strong, for SOC at least purports to agree that some

bur-

dens must be justified under strict scrutiny.
I reviewed the dissent again last evening, and would draw
your attention to two particular statements you might quote.
First, at pl6 she asserts that a health regulation "simply
does not rise to the level of 'official interference' with
the abortion decision."

This is an extraordinarily broad

-3-

statement, for it means that, no matter what the cost, a State
is free to impose any rational health regulations. This demonstrates

she will permit a State to do what-

ever it wants.
the 24-hour wait1

----------~~--------------~---at pp.
22-23 SOC as~mes arguendo that
period imposes an undue burden on the abor-

tion decision, and then finds that this clearly is justified
by both of the State's compelling interests.

This demonstrates

that even where strict scrutiny is to be applied, she will have
no problem upholding a state regulation.

Indeed, her reasoning

is that "the decision ... has grave consequences to the fetus,
whose life the State has a compelling interest to protect and
preserve."

(p. 23)

In short, any State regulation that tends

to impede abortion automatically serves the State's compelling
interest in protecting potential life.

I

This is another indica-

tion that she effectively repudiates the idea that there is
any fundamental right that the State is bound to respect.

~u.prtmt

<!Jllltrl of tqt ~~ ~tattg

Jfasltinghtn. ~. <!J.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1983

RE:

81-746) - City of Akron v. Akron Center For
Reproductive Health, Inc., et al.
81-1172) -Akron Center for Rep. Health, Inc., et
al. v. City of Akron, et al.

Dear Lewis:
I have concluded to drop my separate concurrence in these
cases and wait for another day.
Regards,

lAY!)
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

men

06/13/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

City of Akron, No. 81-746

Attached

is

a

5th

Draft

in

Akron,

responding

to

SOC's

changes.

V On p. 3, I have had to delete the quote that SOC changed,
but I have replaced it with a quote that is similar in effect •
../

The only other change of significance is on p.

3.

At pp.

23-24 of her opinion, SOC has added a footnote asserting that you
have criticized her for doing something you do as well in Planned

tf1~Parenthood

v. Ascroft. vAThe proposed change on p.3 is designed to

make clear what it is that you are criticizing.
You said that you wanted to say something as to SOC's criticism of the trimester system and the changing standard of review.
I recommend against adding something on this point.

9 ~m: ·
~ this

Initially, I wonder whether a change is appropriate at this

SOC's latest draft has not made any
respect.

Her prior discussion at pp. 1-2 contained the same

point that is made now.
-

repudiating

review

subs~ in

the Roe

And her detailed discussion at pp. 2-8 framework and the

that depends on medical

idea of a standard of

technology -- has

not been al-

tered.
I also believe a change would not be advisable.

As you not-

ed, this is the weakest part of our opinion -- but it is a weakness inherited from Roe.

We dealt with it as best we could:

we

2.
eliminated Roe's reliance on a comparison between maternal mortality rates for abortion and childbirth, and then retained the
trimester standard as a useful legal standard.

There really is

not much to say in defense of this other than that there is no
better alternative in light of precedent.
In sum, I think that it would be a mistake to try to argue
further on this issue.

SOC certainly will respond, and I think

we will be at a disadvantage if the discussion is focused on this
issue.

•

81-746 City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.
This Term/ we have considered three cases that
present challenges to laws regulating abortions.

In Roe v.

Wade;{his Court recognized a woman's constitutional right to
choose abortion - subject to the state interests also recognized by the Court.

Roe was decided a decade ago.

None of

our subsequent cases has questioned Roe's authority as a

---

constitutional precedent.

We

:respec-t: -tfie-..QoeMi-He of

sta~

decisis, and koday we reaffirm Roe.
The first of the three cases is here from the
~H..,

Court of Appeals for the s1xth Circuit.

This case involves

a comprehensive/ city regulatory ordinance.

Its validity was

questioned by several abortion clinics and physicians.
of the ordinance's provisions are at
The

firs~nd

second-trimester

most

Five

issue ~ ~·

importan~ equires

that all

abortions~be performed in an acute care,

full service hospital.

If valid, j it would prevent this sur-

gical procedure from being performed;{n an outpatient clinic
- however well staffed and equipped.

Th! tcourt of Appeals

sustaine~he

2.

validity of

this hospital requirement.
In Roe v. Wade we

held;{hat~beginning

at approxi-

mately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy;Ja state
may enact abortion regulations that reasonably relat, Jto the
preservation and protection of maternal health.

It was made

clear, however, that a state is not fre ~to adopt regulations that depart from accepted medical

practice,~nd

that

impose unnecessary burdens on a woman's access to an abortion.
There is convincing

evidenc ~

accepted by the

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists;'and by
other medical

authorities~-

that abortions - at least during

the first few weeks of the second trimester - can be performed safely in

appropriate~on-hospital

facilities at sub-

stantially less cos yfthan in a full hospital.
In light of the record in this

case ~we

think the

Akron hospital requirement unnecessarily/ and unreasonably
burdens/ the woman's right.

We therefore reverse the Court

of Appeals on this issue.
There are

nance~before

-

sent,

f~r

this Court.

other provisions of the Akron ordiThey relate to (i) parental

--

(ii) informed consent,

~n

(iii) a 24-hour waiting period,

and (iv) disposal of fetal remains.

For the reasons stated

in our opinion,j we agree with the Court of Appeals that ~h
of these provisions also is invalid.
Justice O'Connor has filed a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.

.
jtqtrtmt ~ourl of tltt~tb Jtatts
._aslfittghn4 !1. (!}. 211~'!~
CHAMBERS Of"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F: POWELL , .JR .

June 14, 19B3

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: Cases held for City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive
Health Center, Inc., No. Bl-746: Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. Bl-1255: and
Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. Bl-lBS.
No. B2-11BB, Kerrey v. Woman's Services
This appeal involves Nebraska's statute regulating
abortions. In 1979 the DC invalidated provisions dealing
with parental consent for minors, informed consent, a 4Bhour waiting period, and a reporting requirement for all
abortions "prescribed or performed." CAB affirmed. We vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 u.s. 39B (1981).
The DC again held these provisions unconstitutional.
Appellant apparently then abandoned its argument that the
parental consent provision was constitutional, and instead
contended that H.L. v. Matheson shows that strict scrutiny
should not be applied in judging the remainder of the statute. CAB again affirmed.
In light of City of Akron, the decision below appears
correct on two of the issues. The 48-hour waiting period is
plainly invalid. On the reporting requirement, the DC held
only that physicians did not have to report abortions that
were "prescribed" but not "performed."
The informed consent provision presents a closer question. The patient must be advised, inter alia, "of the reasonably possible medical and mental consequences resulting
from an abortion, pregnancy, and childbirth." There is no
"parade of horribles" here, nor is there any requirement
that the attending physician personally convey the information (although he must sign the consent form) • The DC found
that "the punch of the statute is from the requirement that
the patient be informed of the reasonably possible consequences not only of abortion, but also of pregnancy and
childbirth." (App. 51 (emphasis added).) This presents a
close question under City of Akron's discussion of what is
permissible to ensure "the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth."

I •

2.

As this is an appeal, our choices are to affirm, note,
or vacate and remand. On balance, I cannot say that I am
prepared to affirm on the informed consent issue. I therefore will vote to vacate and remand in light of City of Ak~, No. 81-746.
Mr. Ernest has filed the same two motions here as he
did in the Minnesota case. I will vote to deny both motions.

t_.~cP
L.F .-~-. JR.

LFP/vde

81-746#

City of Akron v. Akron Center (Jim}
LFP for the Court
1st draft 3/3/38
2nd draft 3/10/83
3rd draft 5/8/83
4th draft 6/9/83
Joined by CJ, WJB, TM, HAB, JPS
SOC dissent
1st draft 5/5/83
2nd draft 5/10/83
3rd draft 6/13/83
Joined by BRW, WHR

27306 Parkview /7314
Harren , !Hchigan 48092
June 15 , 1983
The lion , Justice Lewis Powell
The Supreme Court of the U. S .
Washington, D. C. 20543
Dear Justice Powell :
Although you may probably get more mail to the contrary,
I wanted to applaud your decision , and that of your
colleagues, denying states the pov.rer to place certain
restrictions on a woman ' s right to an abortion .
About a year ago, I had to make that decision . Although
it is one that I hope never to have to make again, I
am convinced it \vas the right one . Knovdng that there
v1ere safe places for me to go, with sypathetic, nonjudgmental staff, made the situation bearable .
I honestly don't know, and shudder to think, v;hat I

might have done, not that alternative been open to
me .
You may not hear from many other women >·rho feel as I do,
but be assured that they are out there .
Thank you again for the wisdom you and your colleagues
have demonstrated.
Sincerely,

Jana Goldman

CARAL
CALIFORNIA ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE - SOUTH
1337 Santa Monica Mall, Suite 316 I Santa Monica, CA 90401 (213) 393-0513

JUN 2 01983
June 16, 1983

Mr. Justice Powell
The Supreme Court
Washington, D.C. 20543
Sir:
The recent action of the Supreme Court in reaffirming women's
right to obtain an abortion deserves commendation.

Your analysis of

the dangers inherent in various local legislative restrictions on access
to abortion shows great sensitivity to women's concerns about their
health care and about their right to make private moral decisions in
an atmosphere free of harrassment.

Thank you for the effort and the time that you personally invested
in formulating a most perceptive analysis of why Roe vs. Wade must be
upheld.
Yours very truly,

~-;.-5~
Lauren K. Virshup
Executive Director

NATIONAL
ABORTION
RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE
~3
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JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL
US SUPREME COURT
WASHINGTON DC 20543

FOR THE MILLIONS OF ~OMEN LIKE MYSELF WHO HAVE HAD . UNPLANNED
PREGNANCIES AND HAVE CARRIED ON WITH OUR LIVES SUCCESS,ULLY BEeAUS!
OF LEGAL ABORTION WE SAY THANK YOU
MRS C STOLLER
784 PARK
NEW YORK NY 10021
1qi22 EST
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